PILGRIMS AND CRUSADERS: RELIGION AS A POLITICAL DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD*

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Abstract

Can religion be a double-edge sword? On the one hand, religious scriptures often stress the need for compassion, altruism, solidarity and forgiveness, while on the other religious affiliation can be misused as a marker for divisive politics that may spur religious hatred and sectarian violence. This paper explores the links between religion and support for right-wing populist parties in Europe. Using unique granular data on electoral results at the municipality level over the 2006-2017 period, we investigate the historical influence of both inclusive and divisive interpretations of the same religion (Christianism). We gauge latent support for conflicting views of religion by the distance of each European municipality to historical crusade or pilgrimage routes. We show that following an overseas Jihadist terrorist attack involving at least one national European citizen, there is an average increase in support for parties emphasizing religious principles that advocate a tougher / more skeptical stance on migration, multiculturalism and ethnic diversity, in particular close to historical Crusade routes. This is consistent with the view that such exogenous shocks re-activate historical Crusade-related social norms. In contrast, we document that shocks linked to pilgrimage-related traditions of compassion (we draw on fatalities on migration routes) lead to a surge in tolerance near pilgrimage routes, as opposed to places near historical Crusade routes. We document underlying mechanisms and channels of transmission. Our findings are consistent with the view that religion can entail opposite views and generate conflicting political responses.

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"Eye for Eye, Tooth for Tooth." Bible, Exodus 21:24 "If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also." Bible, Matthew 5:39

1 Introduction

Religion is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, religious scriptures frequently emphasize values such as solidarity, altruism, compassion, and forgiveness. On the other, religious affiliation can be used as a divisive marker of identity, fuelling conflict and exclusion. These two facets often coexist within the same religious tradition, reflecting contrasting interpretations of the world and the relationships between individuals. Unsurprisingly, these opposing views have also been frequently exploited by political actors for electoral gain.

Modern European politics illustrates this dynamic vividly. Recent years have seen a surge in support for far-right populist parties, often opposed to minority rights and diversity of opinions (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022).¹ Religious identity, closely tied to issues of migration, has become a particularly salient and polarizing theme of their political platforms. Non-native populations are frequently portrayed by these parties as existential threats to the monocultural nation-state (Mudde, 2007), and Muslim refugees fleeing conflict are often depicted as part of an "Islamic invasion" that undermines Western Christian heritage (Betz, 2013). At its most extreme, this rhetoric invokes the symbolism of the Crusades to advocate for a return to an idealized past of religious and cultural homogeneity (Minkenberg, 2000; Koch, 2017; Godwin and Trischler, 2021).²

At the same time, a more conciliatory stance on interfaith dialogue and a welcoming approach to migrants has been advocated by another influential political actor, the Roman Catholic Church, which can leverage the profound influence of sacred texts and traditions on the lives of numerous communities to promote its message. While the Church has not seldom invoked religious motives to justify violence and the persecution of foreigners and other faiths throughout its long history, particularly since the election of Pope Francis in 2013 the Christian doctrine has increasingly focused on a vision of religion rooted in bridge-building and reconciliation across religious divides. This has often led to explicit conflicts between the Pope and far-right political movements, highlighting the tension between the inclusive and divisive interpretations of Christianity.³

In this paper, we formally investigate the enduring influence of both inclusive and divisive interpretations of religion on politics. Our empirical analysis draws on a comprehensive sample of municipal-

¹We discuss this surge in more depth in Section 3, and illustrate it in Figure 1.

² For a historical account of the invocation of crusade symbolism over the past centuries, see Knobler (2006). For an example of how extremist groups warn about a Muslim invasion and call for a new crusade, see "What the Far Right Gets Wrong About the Crusades", *Time* 10/10/2019. Of course, these tensions, as well as explicit mentions of Crusades in modern politics transcend Europe and have been seen presently in the United States, for instance "Pete Hegseth and His 'Battle Cry' for a New Christian Crusade"*New York Times* 05/12/2024.

³ See, for example "The ultra conservative crusade against Pope Francis", MSNBC 14/04/2019.

level election data from 2006 to 2017 across Europe, where Christianity has historically been the dominant religion, and Islam, practiced by approximately five percent of the population, is the largest religious minority. We proxy support for the opposing interpretations of the Christian Doctrine by the distance of each European municipality to historical crusade and pilgrimage routes. As argued below, along crusade routes divisive social norms have developed over time, while the proximity of pilgrimage routes has foster a culture of contact and welcoming strangers. Thus, if the legacy of crusades captures the "religion of the sword" championed by far-right populist parties, the legacy of pilgrimages is closer to the "religion of bridge-building" endorsed by the current Catholic Church leadership under Pope Francis. We document that, across communities with a historical, if dormant, allegiance to one interpretation or the other, there are persistent differences in voting patterns, attitudes, and cultural norms, as well as differential political responses to contemporaneous events that raise the salience of religious tensions and compassion.

Specifically, we begin by documenting that European municipalities near pilgrimage and crusade routes, while balanced in socio-economic and demographic characteristics, exhibit lasting differences in social norms shaped by their historical legacies. These differences are reflected in their choice of Patron Saints–warrior-like or pilgrim-like–and, more importantly, in systematic variations in survey responses regarding preferences for openness and tolerance. While these ideological differences may not influence voting behavior during "quiet" periods, when major shocks are absent, one may expect latent differences in inter-religious social norms to be "activated" and become salient in periods of significant inter-religious shocks.

To test this conjecture, we examine two types of shocks linked to opposing interpretations of religious tradition. First, we analyze the impact of Jihadist terrorist attacks targeting European citizens abroad, exploiting variation in the nationality of the victims for identification.⁴ Such religiously motivated violence heightens the salience of inter-religious conflict and could trigger latent tensions in areas with a history of sectarian conflict. Specifically, one could expect these terrorism shocks to fuel far-right anti-migration backlash in areas close to historic crusade routes, while having a weaker effect near pilgrimage routes, where a tradition of humanitarian exchange prevails.

Second, we examine the impact of local media coverage of migrant children's fatalities on migration routes across Europe. These tragedies, highlighting the perilous journeys of migrants - half of whom were refugees from predominantly Muslim countries like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan during this period (PEW Research Center, 2017) - may reactivate traditional religious welcome cultures, or "caritas", particularly in areas historically associated with pilgrimage routes, while having a weaker effect in crusade-linked municipalities.

Our findings support these hypotheses. We document that support for far-right parties rises on

⁴ Focusing on attack outside Europe serves the purpose of addressing worries about the potential endogeneity of the location of attacks within Europe. Even if attacks were to deliberately target, say, German or French, citizens, this would be filtered out by our fixed effects structure, as discussed below.

average in countries where a Jihadist terrorist attack involves at least one national citizen in the year leading up to national elections. Conversely, their average support declines following reports of migrant children's fatalities happening in the country in the same period. Crucial for our argument, we show that crusade and pilgrimage municipalities exhibit opposite responses to these shocks. After a Jihadist terrorist attack, municipalities closer to crusader routes show a differentially stronger increase in far-right support, while those near pilgrimage routes a differentially smaller response. In contrast, reports of migrant children's fatalities lead to a stronger than average decline in far-right support in pilgrimage areas, with a weaker than average effect in crusade-linked regions.

These patterns are consistent with the notion that along pilgrimage routes, the bridge-building potential of religion has prospered, while in proximity to crusade routes, intolerance and inter-religious grievances have surged. We conclude that, although historical legacies may remain latent under normal conditions, they can be politicized and mobilized during periods of political stress and crisis.

In terms of mechanisms and channels of transmission, we will document, as mentioned above, the development over centuries of diverging religious norms in areas close to crusade routes and in places nearby pilgrimage roads (see Section 3.8). Further, after presenting the main results, we will move to investigate the potential mechanisms behind these contemporary political shifts, drawing on rich survey data and exploiting the exact timing of polls. In particular, in our setting, randomly some respondents answer survey questions a few days before a given shock (i.e. the major Istanbul bombings), while others from the same country and survey wave answer the same questions right after the shock has occurred. The results of the mechanism Section support the notion that changing voting patterns are indeed driven by (re-activated) differences in social norms.

Our contribution is related to several strands of the academic literature. First of all, our contribution is rooted in the literature on the economics of religion (Iannaccone (1998); Norenzayan (2013); Iyer (2016); Becker *et al.* (2021); Bénabou *et al.* (2022)). This body of work is relevant for our paper, in particular studies that investigate how religion affects political outcomes. For example, Belloc *et al.* (2016) study the role of the Church in the historical transition of Italy towards democracy, Lanzara *et al.* (2023) show that bishop characteristics affect voting for the Christian-Democrats in Italy, and Bentzen and Gokmen (2022) analyze how religion has been used to legitimize political power. Colussi *et al.* (2021) studies how exogenous changes in the salience of minority religion affects voting, and Chaney (2013) documents how economic shocks can affect the political power of religious leaders.

The positive/pro-social potential of religion has been described in several recent papers. In particular, it has been found that religiosity acts as coping mechanism (Bentzen (2019)) and correlates with pro-social preferences and cooperation (Norenzayan (2013); Dohmen *et al.* (2023)).⁵ Yet, as shown in a series of contributions, the social identity fostered by religious belonging can also give rise to religious

⁵Beyond religion, Enke (2020) has documented for the United States a recent rise in the stressing of communal moral values to the detriment of universal principals, throughout the political spectrum, yet to a relatively larger extent for people holding right-wing political positions.

parochialism (Isler *et al.* (2021)), as well as inter-group competition and tensions (Norenzayan *et al.* (2016)). It has even been argued that a clash of civilizations may define politics (Huntington (1996)).

Hence, another relevant literature is on (armed) conflict between groups.⁶. The seminal contribution of Caselli and Coleman (2013) explains how ethnic, racial or religious differences can be exploited by cynical group leaders as markers to foster collective action in rent seeking. In particular, when switching groups is made difficult by such markers, groups are better able to discriminate members of out-groups, and hence a given group can better concentrate the gains of appropriation in their hands. The fact that spoils of appropriation do not have to be shared beyond the group makes appropriation and rent-seeking more attractive, which in turn fuels fighting effort. More recently, the conditions for social discrimination have been characterized, related to labor market outcomes and redistribution policies (Dewan and Wolton (2022)).

Empirical studies linking religion to conflict include the study of Henrich *et al.* (2019) on the impact of war on religiosity, as well as the empirical investigation of Hindu-Muslim violence in India by Jha (2013); Mitra and Ray (2014); Field *et al.* (2008).⁷ Huang *et al.* (2024) document a similar effect in China and extends them to the modern day. Further, drivers of persecution of religious minorities have been studied among others in Anderson *et al.* (2017); Becker and Pascali (2019); Grosfeld *et al.* (2020).

Further, the current contribution is embedded in the literature on populism. See e.g. Inglehart and Norris (2016); Margalit (2019); Rodrik (2021); Guriev and Papaioannou (2022); Manacorda *et al.* (2023); Guiso *et al.* (2023). This literature has emphasized the role of economic drivers, such as trade shocks, technological factors, such as the rise of AI and new media, the global financial crisis, migration patterns, identity and culture more broadly. Still, the the best of our knowledge, the role of religion has not been directly tied to the rise of right-wing populism.

Finally, another related literature studies long-run persistence over long periods of economic history. Key contributions investigate the persistence of ancient hatred (see e.g. Voigtländer and Voth (2012); Nunn (2014); Cantoni *et al.* (2019); Drelichman *et al.* (2021); Fouka and Voth (2022)), with some strand of this literature investigating long-run effects of Medieval religious persecution Voigtländer and Voth (2012); Vidal-Robert *et al.* (2014); Chaney and Hornbeck (2016); Drelichman *et al.* (2021)).⁸ Particularly relevant for us is the study of how past attacks during the Turkish siege of Vienna have been "reactivated" by populists today (Ochsner and Roesel (2019)). Also relevant are the findings on the persistent long-run effect of ancient road networks, such as the Roman roads (Flückiger *et al.* (2022); Dalgaard *et al.* (2022)) or the Silk Road (Blaydes and Paik (2021); Ahmad and Chicoine (2021)).⁹ When

⁶For recent surveys on inter-group conflict see Anderton and Brauer (2021); Rohner (2023, 2024). The impact on conflict of the numbers and sizes of societal groups has for example been studied in Esteban *et al.* (2012); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2021), while the spatial dimension has been investigated in Mueller *et al.* (2022).

⁷For a survey focusing specifically on religion and conflict, see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2019).

⁸For collective memory, see Dessi (2008). See Rohner *et al.* (2013) for a model of how mistrust between groups can persist in so-called "war traps" despite cooperative fundamentals.

⁹See also Michalopoulos *et al.* (2018) for the impact of pre-Islamic trade routes on the spread of Islam.

it comes to the focal points of our study, pilgrimages and Crusades, it turns out that they have received surprisingly little attention in the literature. One exception is Blaydes and Paik (2016) who argue that Crusade mobilization helped to consolidate European state building.

In a nutshell, the current study is –to the best of our knowledge– the first statistical investigation of the long-lasting impact of crusade and pilgrimage routes on voting patterns and social norms, which allows us to gain a better understanding of the contrasting political effects of religion.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the historical context. Next, Section 3 presents the data and descriptive summary statistics. Then, Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the identification strategy and main results. Further, in Section 6 we present robustness checks, Section 7 studies the differential impact of migrant deaths on voting, and in Section 8 channels and mechanisms are investigated. Finally, Section 9 concludes. The Appendix contains a formal game-theoretic model that helps to rationalize the empirical findings. We also include additional summary statistics and robustness checks there.

2 Historical Context

2.1 Crusades

The Crusades were a series of military expeditions carried out from Christian Western Europe against the Muslims during medieval times.¹⁰

To start with the obvious: Crusades led to human suffering and loss of life at an unimaginable scale and are among the worst incidents of sectarian violence in human history. Holt (2019) lists a series of death count estimates, ranging from one to nine million lives lost in total.

These series of campaigns started in 1096 and lasted until 1291. The first call to arms to recapture the Holy Land from the Seljuk Turks was by Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont, France, in November 1095. This original plea to aid the Byzantines was met with tremendous enthusiasm by the nobility, the general population and different military orders such as the Knights of Templar, the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitalliers. As many as 130,000 people joined the calling (Riley-Smith (1991)).

The First Crusade lasted from 1096 to 1099. The formal army was led by Raymond of Saint-Gilles, Godfrey of Bouillon, Hugh of Vermandois and Bohemond of Taranto. A more popular faction called the People's Crusade was was led by Peter the Hermit. On their way to Jerusalem, some of these Crusaders carried out a series of massacres against the Jews in the Rhineland, in modern-day Germany. The Crusaders and their Byzantine allies attacked Nicea, in modern-day Turkey, in 1097. They captured Antioch, in modern-day Syria, in 1098 and proceeded their march towards Jerusalem. The city surrendered in 1099, and devastation and pillaging ensued. The First Crusade can be considered a swift

¹⁰The discussion of the historical context draws on, among others, Phillips (2010); Asbridge (2012); Madden (2013); Riley-Smith (2014).

and decisive win for the Europeans (although at the cost of many innocent lives).

To govern the conquered territories, four Crusader states were established in Jerusalem, Edessa, Antioch and Tripoli. The Crusaders built castles, strengthening their defensive position in the region. In 1144, the Seljuk Muslims captured Edessa. This led to Pope Eugene III, King Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany to call for a Second Crusade. Crusaders were promised material and spiritual privileges by the Pope. Turkish forces defeated the Crusaders in Dorylaeum. The Europeans mounted a counterattack with more than 50,000 troops in the city of Damascus, Syria. The Muslims with the aid of Nur al-Din decisively defeated the Europeans in 1148, putting an end to the Second Crusade. The Second crusade was a fiasco for European Crusaders.

The Third Crusade (1187-1192) followed a similar dynamic as before. Infighting continued in the region and in 1169 the Muslims captured Cairo. In 1187 Muslim leader Saladin and his troops defeated the Europeans again and captured Jerusalem. Alarmed by these advances, Gregory VIII, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, King Philip II of France, and King Richard I of England (known as Richard the Lionheart) called for a new Crusade. In 1191, the Europeans defeated the Muslims in the battle of Arsuf, present-day Israel. From Jaffa, modern Israel, Richard reestablished European control of the area but did not go as far as to recapture Jerusalem. A peace treaty was signed with Saladin, reestablishing the Kingdom of Jerusalem, without the Holy City itself.

Pope Innocent III called for a Fourth Crusade in 1198. However, problems with the Byzantine succession diverted efforts towards Constantinople. Europeans favored Alexius IV, in favor of his uncle Alexius III. Once in power, the former tried to submit Byzantium to Rome, facing stiff opposition that ended up with his strangling in 1204. The anti-Western Alexius V followed. The Crusaders invaded Constantinople, plundering and pillaging the city after its fall, and establishing a Latin state, as after the First Crusade.

A Fifth Crusade was called by Pope Innocent III in 1216 with the ambitious goal of capturing Egypt. The country was attacked by land and sea, but Crusaders were forced to surrender in 1221. In 1229, in the so-called Sixth Crusade, Emperor Frederick II negotiated the transfer of Jerusalem to the Crusaders. From 1248 to 1254, Louis IX of France organized a crusade against Egypt, in what became known as the Seventh Crusade. These French enterprises were a disaster and ended with the King's own death in Tunis.

Other types of Crusades were fought in Europe. A so-called "Holy War" was waged in Spain and Portugal during the 13th Century to expel the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. The final Reconquista battle was won by the Christians in 1492. Pagan regions were attacked at the fringes of Europe in the Baltic states during the 13th Century. A similar war was waged against the Cathars in what today is the South of France. Crusades were fought in Italy against the enemies of the Papal states during the 13th and the 14th Centuries. There were as well a series of popular Crusades including the Children's Crusade of 1212, the Sheperd's Crusade of 1251 and the Popular Crusade of 1309.¹¹

Overall, Crusades were religious wars which defined clear in-groups and out-groups at a continental scale Riley-Smith (2008). For Christians, Crusades were "Holy Wars" aimed at reconquering the "Holy Land" from the "infidels". Enemies included Muslims, Slavs, Mongols and "heretics" such as the Cathars and the Hussites. Crusades were mainly waged en route to Jerusalem, but also encompassed the Near East, Spain and North Africa. Crusades fostered the consolidation of Christendom as a monolithic entity during medieval times (see e.g. Mastnak (2002)). For Muslims, they also constituted a Jihad against the enemies of Islam, as invoked by Nur al-Din.

Hence, crusades also helped to consolidate the Muslim world politically, despite the Suni and Shiite divide (see Hillenbrand (2018); Asbridge (2012)). This process started with the Seljuks, and reached an apex under Saladin. For both sides, Crusades were extremely violent events. Our hypothesis is that the millenary tensions stemming from the Crusades may be exploited politically by populists to incite political identities.

2.2 Pilgrimages

The term pilgrim originally meant stranger or traveler. In the Christian tradition, life itself is a pilgrimage (Riley-Smith (1991)).¹² As early as the 2nd century pilgrims started to visit Christian religious sites. Non-violent pilgrimages to Jerusalem were part of this original tradition, which continued even after Palestine fell to the Muslims in the 7th Century. Early Christian pilgrimages gave rise to medieval pilgrimages associated with Pilgrims can be entirely devotional or penitential. Pilgrimages increased during the 10th and 11th centuries and pilgrims themselves gained social status. Some of them took vows and all of them enjoyed the official protection of the church as well as the right to hospitality along the places they visited in their religious journeys. The network of pilgrimage routes connects places of special religious interest, such as Jerusalem, Rome, Santiago de Compostela or Lourdes, as well as places with relicts of venerated Saints – think for example of Saint Antonio of Padova or Saint Francis of Assisi.

Christian teachings about compassion, altruism, and solidarity are often associated to pilgrimages. As put by Pope Francis in 2006, "a pilgrim carries within him his own history and faith and the lights and shadows of his own life. Each person carries within his or her heart a special wish and a particular prayer. Those who enter the journey feel they are at home, welcomed, understood, and supported." This draws directly on a series of passages in the Bible referring to tolerance, outreach and welcoming strangers. For example the Parable of the "Good Samaritan" in the Bible (Luke 10:29–37) tells the story of a man in need for help and shelter being ignored by members of the elite establishment but being

¹¹A Crusade against the Hussites was fought in the Czech Republic, when Jan Hus was burned in 1415.

¹²The following historical account of pilgrimages draws on Webb (2001); Sumption (2011). Of course there is a pilgrimage tradition that extends to other religions such as Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam.

cared for diligently by a member of a marginalized fringe of society (the "Samaritans"). This is just one example of many stories in the New Testament emphasizing the importance of reaching out to various marginalized groups in society (prostitutes, poor, sick, strangers), which is perfectly in line with the spirit of Pilgrimages. Given the spirit of the exercise, we expect on average key pilgrimage nodes to have developed social norms of openness and tolerance, in contrast with Crusader routes.

2.3 Re-activation of latent historical religious cleavages and mounting populism in recent years

Over our sample period, there has been growth in the Muslim population. In particular, over the period from 2010 to 2016 the share of Muslims in the total European population has increased from 3.8% to 4.9% (PEW Research Center, 2017). This has been the result of natural replacement growth, Muslims being on average younger and having higher fertility rates, as well as due to a spike in Muslim migration (Hackett *et al.* (2019)).

As mentioned above, several populist movements have aimed at exploiting fears over migration and latent historical tensions and/or have made use of terminology that draws on crusades and Medieval armed conflict between Christian and Muslim forces. Strikingly, there has been in recent years a spectacular rise in extreme anti-migration positions, as documented in detail below, when discussing the data used (see Figure 1 in Section 3).

Our analysis will draw on terror attacks as (temporally) exogenous determinants of the perceived salience of religious cleavages, which were central in crusades. Below, when detailing in the next Section the data used, we will depict the evolution and variance of of the number of terror attacks targeted at European citizens, across space and time, since the attacks of 9/11 (See Panel A of Figure 2).¹³ Overall, we observe a marked increase over the past years, and quite substantial geographical variance.

We will also draw on data on deaths of refugees taking place on migration routes. Fatalities from such tragedies may represent exogenous shocks that affect the perceived salience of social norms related to international compassion and solidarity, as emphasized in the tradition of pilgrimages. This is well expressed by Pope Francis appeal at the 110th World Day of Migrants and Refugees 2024 that "There are those who work systematically and every means possible to repel migrants ... and this, when done with awareness and responsibility, is a grave sin." (Pope Francis, General Audience, Saint Peter's Square, 28 August 2024, [Audience].)

The evolution of such death numbers over time, and distribution across space, are shown below in the Data Section (See Figure 3). As for terrorism exposure there is, sadly, and increase in migrant fatalities over time, and the data is characterized by quite substantial spatial variance.

¹³We contribute here on an established literature in economics on the multifaceted impact of terrorism Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003); Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019); Becker and Rubinstein (2011).

After this big picture presentation of the context of the current study, we shall next discuss in depth all data sources used and perform the empirical analysis.

3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

The unit of observation of our baseline analysis is a given European municipality in a given year. In total we cover 84,428 municipalities in 22 countries, from 2006 to 2017. In what follows, we shall describe the main data sources used in our econometric analysis.

3.1 Elections

Our main dependent variable in the baseline analysis will be the percentage of extreme right-wing antimigration vote in a given European municipality in a given year. We use and expand on data from Manacorda *et al.* (2023), who compile information originally produced by national electoral commissions, to construct a municipality-level dataset on the number of votes by party across Europe. Specifically, the dataset spans 84,428 municipalities across twenty major European countries, encompassing nearly half a billion people.¹⁴ The data cover voting outcomes from national lower house parliamentary elections during the 2006-2017 period, except in France, where they refer to first-round Presidential election results.

Following Manacorda *et al.* (2023), we analyze support for far-right parties using data from the 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2017 waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly et al., 2022). This dataset provides a consistent, expert-based assessment of parties' policy positions and ideologies across time and countries. Our focus is on four key dimensions: (1) party positions favoring restrictive immigration policies, (2) the extent of desired integration for immigrants and asylum seekers, ranging from multiculturalism to assimilation, (3) support for the rights of ethnic minorities, and (4) a measure of traditional left-right ideological orientation. For each variable, we focus on extremist parties, defined as those that feature in the top decile of the respective continent-wide distribution, what Manacorda *et al.* (2023) call extreme *communitarian* parties.

Figure 1 displays the vote shares for extreme anti-migration parties across European municipalities in 2010 - the first year when all countries in the sample had held at least one election since 2007 - and 2017. The boundaries of the 279 NUTS2 European regions are also overlaid for reference. The data represent vote shares from the closest preceding election, with redder areas indicating higher support and bluer areas lower support for these parties. The figure highlights the fine-grained nature of the data, revealing significant variation within countries in far-right party support and differing trends across local areas. Notable patterns include increased support for *Alternative für Deutschland* in former East Germany, *Rassemblement National* in southern and northeastern France, and *Lega* in northern Italy.

¹⁴ Appendix Table A1 lists the countries included in the sample alongside the number of municipalities per country.

Closer inspection shows consistently lower far-right support in urban centers, particularly in large cities such as Copenhagen, Milan, Paris, and Prague, compared to their surrounding areas and national averages. Additionally, the figure captures substantial differences between municipalities within the same NUTS2 region, underscoring the localized nature of these trends.

3.2 Terrorist Attacks

We use data from the Global Terrorist Database (GTD) to estimate the effects of religious shocks on political outcomes in Western Europe. The GTD is a database that provides information on terrorist attacks around the world since 1970. For each event, a wide range of information is available, including the date and location of the incident, the weapons used, nature of the target, the number of casualties, and the group or individual responsible.¹⁵

Starting from the raw data, we retain all attacks that happened between 2005 (the year before the first electoral year) and 2017 (the last election year). We observe 105,535 events classified as terrorist. These include all types of attacks—successful and failed, with or without casualties—targeting any group (police or civilians) and perpetrated by various terrorist groups, ranging from Islamist to farright and white nationalist. Note, also, that if a terrorist attack happened in several locations even in the same day, there will be as many entries as the locations in which the event happened. For instance, the 2005 London bombings that occurred in four different locations within the same day and it is they are thus classified as four separate events.

We then focus on attacks that caused at least one European victim. One limitation of the GTD database is that the nationality of the victims is, in several cases, classified as "International" or "Multinational". We included all attacks in which a citizen from a European country was killed. Among these events, we further refined the data and retrieved the nationalities of other victims classified as "International" or "Multinational". This selection reduces the number of events to 263. Based on the perpetrators' identity and affiliation, we identified 156 Islamic terrorist attacks, i.e., attacks carried out by groups classified as Islamic extremists.¹⁶ These attacks occurred in 30 different countries and involved citizens from 17 nationalities.

Among these attacks, we eventually keep those happening in a non-European country (which is arguably more exogenous); overall, we observe 117 attacks involving citizens of 13 European countries.

Figure 2, Panel A, plots the evolution of the cumulative number of Jihadist Terrorist attacks in which at least one European victim was recorded. The dashed red line instead only considers the subset of attacks that happened outside Europe. Strikingly, while the trend is a monotonic overall increase, there is substantial spatial heterogeneity, with some European countries suffering bigger losses from terrorism attacks taking place outside Europe (see Figure 2, Panel B).

¹⁵The data was downloaded in May 2022 and was last updated at that time.

¹⁶63 attacks were perpetrated by unknown groups, therefore dropped from the analysis.

Figure 1: Extreme Right-Wing Anti-Migration Voting



(a) Extreme Right-Wing Anti-Migration Voting in 2010

(b) Extreme Right-Wing Anti-Migration Voting in 2017



Note. The Figure plots the geographical distribution of voting to political parties that "Strongly favors a restrictive policy on immigration" in 2010 (Panel a) and 2017 (Panel b).

Figure 2: Evolution and Distribution of Terror Exposure



(a) Terror Exposure over Time

Note. The Figure in Panel (a) plots the cumulative number of terrorist attacks in which at least one European national was killed over the 2005-2017 period. The Figure in Panel (b) shows the geographical distribution of the victims, with darker colors representing a higher number of attacks targeting nationals of a given country.

In terms of the econometric analysis, we will combine elections and attacks by exploiting both the timing and the nationality of the victim(s). We thus defined as "treated" national elections that occurred

within 365 days from a terrorist attack in which at least a country national died. Out of 72 elections taking place between 2001 and 2017, we identify 15 treated ones; Appendix Figure A1 plots the share of these "treated" elections in a given month over the window considered.¹⁷

3.3 Migrant Fatalities

Another type of shock that we investigate are news about migrant fatalities. In particular, we focus on news reports on refugee children dying on migration routes across Europe. Here we contribute to the literature on identity politics and populism in Europe, which has stressed the important role of migration (Noury and Roland, 2020). We draw in the "Fortress Europe" data which covers the years 2005-2015, and supplement this with data from IOM Missing Migrant project for 2016 and 2017.

In what follows, we discuss these data sources in more depth. Following an IOM report (Brian and Laczko, 2014), our primary source is the blog "Fortress Europe", created by Italian journalist Gabriele del Grande.¹⁸ The website provides a comprehensive list of all migrants attempting to reach their destination countries from 1988 to 2015.¹⁹ The data include the date and location (country) of the incident, a brief description containing key details (such as the number of deaths and whether minors were involved), and the source of the information.

To retrieve information for 2016 and 2017, we use the International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s Missing Migrants Project records.²⁰ Like our primary source, this database includes incidents involving migrants who died at state borders or while migrating to an international destination. It provides information on the date and country of death (or disappearance) and the number of victims, distinguishing between women and children. The data cover the period from 2014 to 2024 and are regularly updated. For our analysis, we only use data from 2016 (which is partially missing from our primary source) and 2017 (the last year of our observation period).

The data on migrant fatalities is displayed in Figure 3, where Panel A depicts the overall time trend. It is found that overall the number of fatalities on migrant routes increases, which may be related to increasing refugee numbers over our sample period. In contrast, Panel B represents the geographical distribution of these tragedies, with quite substantial variation, and higher exposure in Southern European countries, through which main migration routes pass.

¹⁷As an example, suppose two countries have elections in May 2008, e.g. France and Spain. A Jihadist attack outside Europe takes place in March 2008, killing a French national; at the same time, no Spanish national is killed in a terrorist attack in the 365 days before the election. The share of treated elections in May 2008 would be equal to 50%.

¹⁸The primary source of information for these records is news media, with civil society organizations serving as a secondary source.

¹⁹The list stops in February 2016, though we consider 2016 as an incomplete year of observation.

²⁰The data can be downloaded from https://missingmigrants.iom.int/.

Figure 3: Evolution and Distribution of Migrant Deaths





Note. The Figure in Panel (a) plots the cumulative number of events in which at least one migrant died, distinguishing episodes in which children died. The Figure in Panel (b) shows the geographical distribution of incidents, with darker colors representing a higher number of deaths occurrin in a given country.

p75

p90

p50

p25

1.001

3.4 Crusade and Pilgrimage Routes

Crusades. The Crusader armies traveled to Constantinople by various routes. We focus our attention on the trajectory of the First Crusade, during which Christian forces mainly traveled by land (contrary to later campaigns) using to a substantial extent the existing Roman Road Network.²¹ In particular, we combined maps of the Crusaders' routes provided in Tyerman (2007) with the digital version of Roman roads identified in the Barrington Atlas (McCormick *et al.*, 2013). Figure4a depicts the routes taken by the main armies along with the centroids of European municipalities in our electoral data. The starting points of routes are where different armies gathered. Overall, about 15% of European municipalities lie within 50km from a route of the First Crusade (as highlighted in the Figure).

Pilgrimages. Pilgrim routes typically connect key (Christian) pilgrimage sites, such as Jerusalem, Santiago de Compostela, and Rome. We rely on historical sources (e.g. Codex Calixtinus) and GPS tracks from several sources (e.g. caminodesantiago.me) to retrace the web of pilgrimage routes.²² As highlighted in Figure 4b, the main pilgrimages used in the analysis are the historical ones to Santiago, Rome, and Jerusalem. In particular, we use the different trails of the Camino de Santiago (Via Podiensis, Camino Frances, Camino Ingles, Camino Primitivo, the Silver Way), the Via Francigena (i.e. the pilgrimage route from the cathedral of Canterbury to Rome), the Via Romea Germanica (historic pilgrimage route connecting Central and Northern Europe to Rome), and the Jerusalem Way.

3.5 Measures Used to Proxy Social and Religious Norms

Cathedrals. We have collected information at the municipality level on whether a given municipality has a Cathedral. To compile this data, we draw on Buringh *et al.* (2020) that provided a dataset on the construction of 1,695 major churches in present-day Europe between 700 and 1500 CE. Only some European countries are covered, these are Italy, France, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. This dataset includes the date of construction and the name of the churches.

Bishoprics. Using data from the MAPS (Mapping Past Societies) platform we have put together data on which municipalities had Bishoprics in the medieval period (600-1450 CE).²³.

²¹As discussed earlier, later Crusade campaigns have frequently involved traveling by sea, and have been of varying magnitude. It is understood that Roman Roads may of course also have a direct effect, as they represent major transport routes. As discussed further below, we perform an extensive robustness analysis that shows that controlling for Roman Roads and other potential confounders does not affect our findings. We focus on the First Crusade, since it was the most important historically and given its usage of land routes.

²²The Codex Calixtinus is a 12th-century manuscript that serves as an essential historical and cultural artifact related to the Camino de Santiago. It consists of five books; the Book V, known as the Pilgrim's Guide, represented the first detailed guidebook for pilgrims, offering practical advice on routes, accommodations along the Way of Saint James.

²³The dataset (formerly known as Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval Civilizations - DARMC) and the interactive maps are available here: https://darmc.harvard.edu/

(b) Pilgrims

Figure 4: Crusades and Pilgrimages Routes in Europe

(a) Crusaders

Note. The Figure plots routes of the First Crusade (Panel a) and Pilgrimages in Europe (Panel b) along with municipalities' centroids. Centroids colored in red (green) are those that lie within 10km from the nearest crusade (pilgrimage) route.

Saints Data. Drawing on data from catholicsaints.info, we have compiled information on whether a given municipality or church has a Patron Saint, and if, yes, what type of activities a given Patron Saint

was involved in. In particular, we distinguish between Patron Saints who were "Crusaders" and others who were "Pilgrims". To construct this data, we merged the information on patron Saint with municipalities. The information on the profession/activity of the Saint stems from the same web source.²⁴ We classify as Crusader those Saints who, according to catholicsaints.info, were either Crusaders themselves or have been reported as Patron Saints of Crusaders. Saint George, for instance, emerged as a central figure and symbol for the Crusaders, synonymous with divine support and Christian valor during their campaigns. During the siege of Antioch in the First Crusade, a vision of Saint George reportedly appeared, signaling divine intervention that preceded the defeat of the Saracens and the fall of the town (Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymytanorum, ch. 15). This miraculous event solidified his reputation as a protector of Christian forces during the Crusades (Edgington and Sweetenham, 2016). Similarly, we classify as Pilgrims those Saints who were pilgrims themselves or have been reported as protectors of pilgrims. Saint James the Greater, one of Jesus' closest disciples, is celebrated as the patron of pilgrims. Known for leaving his fishing nets to follow Christ without hesitation, he later became associated with the Camino de Santiago, a famous pilgrimage route to his tomb in Santiago de Compostela. Tradition holds that after his martyrdom in Jerusalem, his remains miraculously traveled to Spain, where his tomb was rediscovered in the 9th century. St. James is often depicted as a pilgrim with a staff and shell, guiding others on their spiritual journey.

Crusader Origin. We also include data on the geographical origins of Crusaders who mobilized during the First through Fourth Crusades. For this endeavor, we make use of data from Blaydes and Paik (2016).

3.6 Survey Data

To study the mechanisms and channels of transmission, we use the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) 2010-2016, which surveyed more than 50,000 individuals from "transition countries", as well as a subset of Western countries (Nikolova and Sanfey, 2016).²⁵ One rare and useful feature of the LITS is the information on the respondents' municipality of residence and interview date.²⁶ This fine-grained geographical and temporal structure allows us to investigate whether the closeness to a route is correlated with attitudes towards minorities and out-groups, and whether there is a differential change in attitudes in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, depending on the proximity to a route.In particular, we focus on the question regarding "People you do not want to have as neighbors." Among the possible answers,

²⁴Most of the municipalities in our electoral data are not covered by the Saints dataset, and thus they appear as not having a patron Saint (overall, only 16 percent of the municipalities are associated with a patron Saint in our data). However, the probability of being included in the dataset does not differ significantly between pilgrimage and crusader municipalities.

²⁵Countries that are present both in our electoral data and LITS surveys are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, UK, Greece, Sweden, and France.

²⁶For an interesting application of this identification strategy in Africa, see Depetris-Chauvin *et al.* (2020).

we consider immigrants, people of a different race, people who speak a different language, and people of a different religion. This question was only included in the 2010 and 2016 survey waves.²⁷

3.7 Socio-Demographic Data

We use information on the longitude and latitude of each municipality's centroid, which is used to compute distances to Crusades or Pilgrimages routes. Further, we include a series of baseline characteristics originating from Population Censuses. In particular, our socio-demographic measures used for a balancing table and as controls include population, GDP per capita, urban share, foreign born share, population age structure (Manacorda *et al.*, 2023).

3.8 Descriptive Summary Statistics

We start by examining how places close to crusade or pilgrimage routes may differ from other areas that are not close to neither type of routes. In particular, our goal is to investigate whether there are systematic socio-economic differences between these two types of locations, which could lead to the presence of confounders in the econometric analysis that we carry out in the next Section. Figure 5a displays the findings of a simple "balancing table". We find that areas close to the two types of routes are on average different from other municipalities in Europe (the benchmark). In particular, they are typically larger, better connected and more developed. Importantly, however, they are *not* different between themselves, i.e. neighborhoods from crusade routes are on average very similar to neighborhoods from pilgrimage routes.

After having shown that, overall, Crusade and Pilgrimage areas are comparable in terms of general socio-demographic characteristics, we will investigate if there are persistent differences in religious social norms. In Figure 5b we start by studying if there are salient differences in the likelihood of having a Cathedral or a Bishopric, which can proxy for the general importance of religion in a given area. We find that, unsurprisingly, both areas close to Crusade and to Pilgrimage routes have developed into more important religious centers that other locations. Yet importantly, there are no significant differences between Crusade versus Pilgrim routes.

A different picture emerges when focusing on particular dimensions of religious orientation. As shown for the third and fourth outcome variables in Figure 5b, strikingly, there are more Patron Saints with a "Crusader" background in areas close to Crusade routes, while more Saints with "Pilgrimage" background have been made Patron Saints near Pilgrimage areas. And these differences in Patron Saints' background have persisted until today.

Showcasing the values transmitted by these "role model" Saints may indeed have lastingly affected the type of manifestation of religious norms in a given area. While in some place more focus may have

²⁷Another reason for focusing exclusively on the 2010 and 2016 waves is that these surveys provide information about the date and municipality of residence.

lied on a divisive interpretation of religious traditions (i.e. distinguishing believers from heretics), in other areas that humanitarian side of religious practice may have been predominately emphasized (i.e. stressing hospitality and "loving thy neighbor").

Beyond this potential channel of persistence over time of religious social norms, also the fact that Crusade participants more often actually came from areas close to Crusade routes (as illustrated for the last outcome in Figure 5b) may have made a difference. This fact speaks to the role of local recruitment during the crusades, especially during the first one. Returning back to their hometown, crusaders may have lastingly transmitted there the ideology and norms related to Crusades.

This diverging pattern in religious social norms in Crusade versus Pilgrim regions is visible in Figures 6a and 6b. If before the Crusades started there was no pre-trend and difference in the likelihood of naming a Church according to particular "types" of Saints, after the Crusades started, a wedge opened up for several centuries in areas close to Crusade routes disproportionally more churches were named after Crusader Saints, while in places close to Pilgrimage routes disproportionally more churches were named after a Saint associated to Pilgrimage.

4 Identification Strategy

Our identification strategy is to exploit the fine-grained heterogeneous impact of arguably exogenous shocks that vary over time. We first focus on the initial shock we study, terror attacks, before discussing also briefly the second kind of shock we exploit, namely migrant fatalities.

Jihadist terrorist attacks are conjectured to have the potential to activate latent divisive religious norms related to the historical exposure to Crusades. As discussed above, Crusades have left traces in terms of role models and religious practice (as shown e.g. by Crusader Saints prominently featured in local parishes and folklore). However, terrorist acts could be endogenous to a variety of factors, such as national or local policies. Consider for example that in a town A there is a hostile climate against immigrants and a terror attack takes place, while in town B relationships are peaceful. If then in town A there is a greater anti-immigrant vote than in B, this may not necessarily be due to the terror attack but could simply reflect the greater underlying tensions to start with.

One of the ways in which we deal with this is that we focus on terrorist attacks taking place abroad, where at least one victim is a citizen of the affected country. This rules out local effects, as in the town A versus town B example above.

We also filter out time-invariant municipality characteristics by controlling for municipality fixed effects and we control for global time varying shocks by including election year dummies, as well as baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies.

In particular, we start off with estimating the following, simple equation that investigates how terror attack shocks affect voting:

Figure 5: Crusades and Pilgrimages Routes: Baseline Socio-Demographic Characteristics and Religiosity



(a) Balancing Figure of Baseline Socio-Demographics



Note. Each couple of coefficients for crusade and pilgrimage routes originates from a regression where the dependent variable is the one at the bottom of the x-axis (population, gdp etc). The main explanatory variables are dummies of being within 10km from crusade and pilgrimage routes. The label contains the t-tests of equality of coefficients.

Figure 6: Crusades and Pilgrimages Routes: Church Building



(a) Share Churches Named after a Crusader Saint

(b) Share of Churches Named after a Pilgrim Saint



Note. Cumulative number of churches named after a patron of crusades or (saint crusader) over the cumulative number of churches within 10 km distance (in Panel A). Cumulative number of churches named after a patron of pilgrims or (saint pilgrim) over the cumulative number of churches within 10 km distance (in Panel B). Diff-in-Diff model, baseline year 900, country x year fixed effect and municipality fixed effects included.

$$y_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{ct} + \delta'_t X_i + \lambda_t + \theta_i + u_{ict}$$
(1)

Note that $T_{ct} = 1$ if a citizen from country *c* has died in a terrorist attack within the last year before election year *t*. X_i are baseline characteristics at the municipality level, interacted with year dummies. Further, λ_t and θ_i are election year time effects and municipality fixed effects, respectively.

As a next step, we examine our main question of interest, namely how different religious norms modulate such shocks to perceived religious salience. In particular, we estimate the following, augmented specification:

$$y_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{ct} + \beta_2 T_{ct} \times Crus_i + \beta_3 T_{ct} \times Pilg_i + \delta'_t X_i + \lambda_{ct} + \theta_i + u_{ict}$$
(2)

Note that $Crus_i$ and $Pilg_i$ are dummies for the proximity (10km) to a Crusade or Pilgrim route, respectively. Note that in this main specification we also control for the very demanding battery of Country×Year fixed effects, as well as municipality fixed effects. As mentioned above, this fixed effects structure allows to filter out all confounding factors that are time variant (such as e.g. proximity to border, sea access, elevation, climate, proximity to economic centers, etc), as well as shocks at the level of a country and year (as e.g. close national elections, recessions, rotating EU presidency, etc).

As a next step, we shall run analogous estimations but focusing on another shock to religious sentiment, namely migrant deaths. If jihadist terror exposure is conjectured to reactivate "divisive" religious norms, in contrast, one may expect that migrant fatalities could reactivate religious norms of compassion and hospitality, related to traditional pilgrimages. Formally, we run the exactly analogous regression specifications as above, but simply replacing the terrorism variable with the measure on migrant fatalities. We again focus on fatalities occurring in the entire country, rather than investigating local exposure, and we shall include the same aforementioned batteries of fixed effects.

5 Main Results

We start by presenting the results from the first specification that examines the impact of terror attack exposure on voting patterns, without distinguishing a municipality's location vis-à-vis crusade and pilgrimage routes. Figure 7 presents the findings. Strikingly, in the aftermath of terror attacks abroad victimizing national citizens, there is a statistically significant surge in right-wing extreme antiimmigration, anti-multiculturalism and anti-ethnic minority votes. This finding is in line with our conjecture that being exposed to jihadist terror attacks abroad may reactivate and exacerbate divisive social norms and inter-group tensions. This also also in line with the association between terrorism and nationalistic voting found e.g. in Peri *et al.* (2020). The core of our research question being about the contrasting effects of religion, we now move to our main specification that distinguishes the locations of all municipalities with respect to crusade and pilgrimage routes. Hence our focus is on the *differential* response to a common terrorism shock, depending on the religious history of a place. The results are presented in Figure 8. First of all, notice that the main effect of a terror attack is perfectly multicollinear with the demanding battery of country x year fixed effects that we include, and hence drops. We can observe from the Figure that there are remarkable differences between areas near crusade vs pilgrim roads. Concretely, while terror shocks lead to a sizable surge in right-wing extremist anti-migration, anti-multiculturalism, anti-ethnic minority votes near crusade routes, on the contrary the effects of terror victimization are attenuated in the proximity of historical pilgrimage trajectories. This is consistent with the hypothesized enduring impact of the pro-social versus exclusionary aspects of religion.

6 Robustness Checks

In what follows we shall briefly mention the various robustness checks carried out. The underlying Tables and Figures are all relegated to the Appendix. In particular, Figure A2 studies the impact of all jihadist terror attacks, including the ones taking place on European soil and finds that our results are very similar for this more broadly defined exposure.

Further, Figure A3 controls for the presence of Roman roads, finding that our main results on Crusade and Pilgrimage routes are unchanged.

As a next sensitivity check, we show in Figure A4 that our findings are unaltered when we focus on a shorter time window (180 days) before elections.

Next, in the spirit of a placebo exercise, we estimate the impact of non-jihadist terrorism in Figure A5, finding that indeed any effects are quantitatively small, often insignificant and clustered around zero.

Finally, we study demographic endogeneity in Figure A6, by adding all the main baseline characteristics interacted with the treatment variable. Estimated coefficients are only marginally affected, ultimately suggesting that the differential effect along the crusade and pilgrimage routes is not captured by economic and social characteristics of these places when a religious shock occur.

7 Migrant Deaths

If jihadist terror attacks can be seen as a shock that reactivates Crusade-related religious norms, tragic deaths on migrant routes may be shocks that reactivate humanitarian religious norms related to the pilgrimage tradition. This is well illustrated by Pope Francis' aforementioned quote that "There are those who work systematically and every means possible to repel migrants ... and this, when done with



Figure 7: Baseline effects of terror attack exposure on voting (β_1 estimates)

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_1 of equation 1, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a terrorist attack occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.



Figure 8: Baseline effects of crusade and pilgrimage route proximity on voting (β_2 and β_3 estimates)

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a terrorist attack occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, country by year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

awareness and responsibility, is a grave sin." (Pope Francis, General Audience, Saint Peter's Square, 28 August 2024, [Audience].)

As mentioned, we run exactly the same regressions as above, but simply with as explanatory variable of interest deaths taking place on migration routes, instead of the terrorism variable. We expect migrant deaths to sparkle solidarity and a humanitarian response, particularly close to pilgrimage routes, where religious norms of hospitality may be reactivated. Figure 9 depicts the baseline effect, highlighting indeed the existence of an overall greater solidarity and hospitality when faced with news on tragic fatalities. This figure is symmetric (now negative) to the previous one on terrorist attacks. When distinguishing between different areas in Figure 10 we see that the effect of greater solidarity and norms of hospitality is more than proportional in areas close to historical pilgrimage routes, while the effects are more dismal in places exposed to historical Crusade-related religious norms. We can rationalize these latter findings with a change in salience, whereby migration, despite the tragic events, becomes a more relevant issue (Colussi *et al.*, 2021). Again, this result parallels the previous one, now with a tragic shock towards compassion.

Overall, these findings show how different types of shocks may activate opposing religious traditions, with a consistent pattern of Crusade routes being always associated with more divisive and xenophobic norms, while places closer to pilgrimage routes being associated with religious traditions emphasizing hospitality and empathy.

8 Channels and Mechanisms

8.1 LITS

To shed light on potential mechanisms behind the estimated effects, we employ data from 2010 and 2016 Life in Transition Survey (LITS), which surveyed more than 50,000 individuals on trust, attitudes towards minorities and views on issues such as democracy and the role of the state.²⁸ While the focus of the LITS is mainly on "transition countries" in Eastern Europe and Asia, a subset of Western countries is also covered. We only retained countries surveyed in LITS that are at the same time present in our electoral dataset. These are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

A unique feature of the LITS is that it provides the exact location of the respondents' place of residence, allowing us to compute the distance to the closest pilgrimage or crusade route. Additionally, we know –for a subset of countries– the date on which the interview was conducted. Throughout the analysis, we focus on trust towards different categories of people, as well as on what groups of people the respondents declare to not want to have as neighbors.

²⁸Note that we excluded 2006, as the date of the interview is missing, the sample of European countries included is more limited, and there are no questions on neighbors.



Figure 9: Migrant deaths: Baseline effect

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_1 of equation 1, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a migrant children death occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. The specification further controls for the occurrence of a migrant death within a year from election. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.



Figure 10: Migrant deaths: Differential effect

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a migrant children death occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, country by year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. The specification further controls for the occurrence of a migrant death within a year from election, along with the interactions with distances to pilgrimage and crusade routes. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.



Figure 11: Cross-sectional differences in attitudes, depending on the proximity to crusade versus pilgrimage routes

Note. Each couple of coefficients for crusade and pilgrimage routes originates from a regression where the dependent variable is the one at the bottom of the x-axis. The main explanatory variables are dummies of being within 10km from crusade and pilgrimage routes. The label contains the t-tests of equality of coefficients.

We perform three different empirical exercises. First, we are interested in understanding the extent to which closeness to a crusade or pilgrim route is correlated with attitudes towards minorities and out-groups, as well as trust towards institutions and people. Figure 11 presents the results of the first of these empirical investigations on the question about what group of people a respondent does not want as neighbors. This cross-sectional analysis highlights that on average people living close to historical Crusade routes are less keen to have as neighbors people from a different race, speaking a different language or having a different religion. This is consistent with the presence of persistent divisive social norms –related to the spirit of historical Crusades– reflecting and nurturing inter-group tensions.

Second, we investigate the change in attitudes between 2010 and 2016, where issues of immigration and Islamic terrorism became more salient to the public eye (remember the aforementioned increase in



Figure 12: Over time differences in attitudes, depending on the proximity to crusade versus pilgrimage routes

Note. Each pair of coefficients represents the differential change in the effects of being within 10 km of a crusade or pilgrimage municipality on the the dependent variable at the bottom of the x-axis between 2010 and 2016.

the share of the Muslim population in Europe from 3.8% to 4.9%, as well as the surge in terrorist attacks on nationals taking place outside Europe, depicted in Figure 2a in the Appendix). Specifically, we estimate a potentially differential effect over these six years, depending on the closeness to pilgrimages or crusade routes. Figure 12 shows that over this period of generally mounting tension, there was a surge in the share of people next to Crusade routes who do not want people from different races and religions as neighbors, while close to pilgrim routes –if anything– there was increase in tolerance towards immigrants and people from a different race.

Third, we exploit the timing of terrorist attacks relative to the interview date of LITS polling. In particular, we compare respondents interviewed just before versus just after the attack and estimate whether there is a change in attitudes, depending on the respondents' distance to pilgrimage and crusade routes. For this last empirical exercise, we use the Istanbul attack that occurred on January 12,



Figure 13: Post-versus-pre terror attack interview answers

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if survey respondents have been interviewed after the January 2016 attack in Istanbul. Only 2016wave respondents are used in the analysis. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, date and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

2016, when a group of German tourists were killed by a suicide bomber in the historical center of Istanbul. We are bound to focus solely on Germany and this particular episode, as this was the only incident of a nationality affected by a terrorist attack in the middle of the interview period. Figure 13 depicts the results. It is found that for those interviewed after the bombing intolerance had surged in areas close to Crusade routes, while being smaller in the vicinity of pilgrimage routes. This is again consistent with the notion that such shocks re-mobilize latent Crusade-related norms of intolerance next to Crusade routes, while drawing on more reconciliatory religious norms next to Pilgrimage sites.

In a nutshell, over all these exercises drawing on LITS data, there emerges the clear-cut picture that intolerance towards multiple dimensions of potential neighbor groups is larger in areas close to crusade routes, compared to places nearby historical pilgrimage roads, and these differences surge when triggered by exogenous shocks related to inter-group conflict.

9 Conclusion

This paper has studied how religion may act as a politically double-edged sword. Crusades represent the more antagonistic, exclusionary side of religion, while pilgrimage routes proxy the more bridging side of religion. We interact these local historical dimensions of religion with two opposing salience shock: First, we exploit terrorist attacks against Europeans, perpetuated outside Europe, which can re-activate exclusionary religions norms related to historical Crusades. Second, we draw on fatalities on migrant routes, which may be a shock that can re-activate traditional religious norms related to the traditional welcome culture next to pilgrimage routes.

Filtering out time-invariant confounders at the municipality level, and annual shocks at the country level, we uncover differential impacts on right-wing populist voting in Europe, at the municipal level. In particular, when these shocks occur nearby historical crusade routes, there is a surge in extreme right-wing anti-migration and anti-minority voting, while a moderation effect is observed close to pilgrimage routes. We show that deeper societal attitudes contribute to a mechanism of persistence. History can be "activated" politically by populists, yet this message resonates differently depending on the underlying historical religious context.

One key policy implication of the current study is that peaceful and non-discriminatory interaction –such as on pilgrim routes– fosters persistent inter-group trust and tolerance that can serve as a rampart against future hostilities. This is in line with the so-called "contact hypothesis" (Allport *et al.* (1954)) and with results of a series of recent studies (Cilliers *et al.* (2016); Okunogbe (2018); Mousa (2020); Lowe (2021); Cáceres-Delpiano *et al.* (2021); Rohner and Zhuravskaya (2023, 2024)).

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Appendix

In this Appendix we shall first present a simply model that can fix ideas on the underlying mechanisms at work. Next, we shall present some additional descriptive statistics before including a battery of robustness checks.

A The Model

A.1 The Setting

In order to discuss conceptually the expected impact of religion on conflict, we shall present a simple workhorse model of a between-group conflict, modeled as a strategic contest. We start from a standard two-group contest success function setting, and enrich this framework with religion-specific features. The solution concept that we apply for this non-cooperative, simultaneous one-shot game with complete information is the Nash Equilibrium.

In particular, the two groups are aggregate players each, and labeled *i* and *j*. They have as only choice variables the level of fighting, f_i and f_j , respectively, and maximize their utilities U_i and U_j , respectively. The winning chances of a given group equal its fighting effort divided by the total fighting effort (which corresponds to the simplest ratio-form contest success function). The winner's "prize" captured is labeled π^W , while the loser's one corresponds to π^L . We have the following utility functions:

$$U_{i} = = \frac{f_{i}}{f_{i} + f_{j}} \pi^{W} + \frac{f_{j}}{f_{i} + f_{j}} \pi^{L} - cf_{i}$$
(3)

$$U_j == \frac{f_j}{f_i + f_j} \pi^{\mathsf{W}} + \frac{f_i}{f_i + f_j} \pi^{\mathsf{L}} - cf_j \tag{4}$$

While the above utility functions are very standard in conflict models, in what follows we shall add specific religion-related features to this canonical model. In particular, we consider the following three channels: First, one part of the contested "prize" is a private good. While the winning group typically grabs most of these rents, some of the windfall may also be captured by the losing group. There will be a parameter $0 \le \lambda < 1$ in the framework that is larger if the losing group captures more of the rents. As shown in Caselli and Coleman (2013), visible and hard-to-change group characteristics such as religion make it easier for the winning group to exclude the defeated rivals from the distribution of rents, and hence we shall accordingly presume that λ is lower in areas where religion is more salient. Honor to whom honor is due: We shall call this channel the "Caselli-Coleman effect".

Second, part of the "prize" of contest is a public good that is non rival and non exclusive. If groups have very different preferences then the public good chosen by the winner may be of little or even zero use for the defeated group, while if groups have interacted much in the past and their social norms have partially converged, then their appreciation of public goods may not differ so much, and hence even the defeated group may have a substantial appreciation of the public good put in place by the winner. This relative utility gain for the losing group of the winner's public good is captured by parameter $0 \le \gamma < 1.^{29}$ We shall presume that if religious exercise fosters peaceful and non-discriminatory interaction (such as e.g. on pilgrim routes) it may actually lead

²⁹Group similarities vs differences have been captured in models of secession, such as e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (1997); Esteban *et al.* (2022), but typically not focusing on religion per se.

to preference convergence, while of course religious conquest (as during the crusades) does typically not have this effect. The potential bridge building force of religion on e.g. pilgrim routes is labeled "Melting-pot effect".

Finally, religious scriptures often prone altruism. The Bible, for example, famously prones to "love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matthew, 22:39). Hence, to capture this potential effect (which obviously may depend on the context of interaction), we shall include an "altruism" parameter, where groups potentially give positive weights to the payoff received by the other group. This will be captured by parameter $0 \le \phi < 1$. We call this the "Love-thy-neighbor effect".

In the model, the winner obtains

$$\pi^{W} = \left(P + \frac{R}{1+\lambda}\right) + \phi(\gamma P + \frac{\lambda R}{1+\lambda}),\tag{5}$$

where the first part corresponds to both the public *P* and the part of the private good *R* captured, while the second part is the (altruism) valuation of the corresponding public and private good of the opponent group. Remember, as described above, the defeated group "enjoy" only partially the public good chosen by the winner, and receives a less than proportional share of the private good.

The payoff of the loser corresponds analogously to

$$\pi^{L} = (\gamma P + \frac{\lambda R}{1+\lambda}) + \phi(P + \frac{R}{1+\lambda}).$$
(6)

A.2 The Equilibrium

We shall start by reformulating the utility functions into

$$U_{i} = = \frac{f_{i}}{f_{i} + f_{j}} (\pi^{W} - \pi^{L}) + \pi^{L} - cf_{i}$$
(7)

$$U_{j} == \frac{f_{j}}{f_{i} + f_{j}} (\pi^{W} - \pi^{L}) + \pi^{L} - cf_{j}$$
(8)

Solving the Nash Equilibrium of this game corresponds to solving this system of two equations and two unknowns (f_i and f_j), and yields

$$f_i = f_j = \frac{(\pi^W - \pi^L)}{4c}.$$
 (9)

When replacing $(\pi^W - \pi^L)$ by the underlying parameters we obtain the following characterization: **Theorem 1:** In equilibrium the fighting efforts are given by

$$f_i = f_j = \frac{P(1-\gamma)(1-\phi) + \frac{R}{1+\lambda}(1-\lambda)(1-\phi)}{4c}.$$
 (10)

We can easily see that all that raises the stakes of conflict $(\pi^W - \pi^L)$ fuels fighting, while a higher cost of fighting (*c*) leads to lower equilibrium fighting efforts. These cost could capture for example weapon costs or opportunity costs of foregone incomes, as time spent for fighting cannot be used for productive work. Hence, higher productivity and wages would be reflected in a larger *c*.

When it comes to factors that increase he stakes of conflict $(\pi^W - \pi^L)$, and hence fighting efforts, we can easily see that $\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial P} > 0$, $\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial R} > 0$, $\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial \phi} < 0$, $\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, $\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial \lambda} < 0$. This can be summarized in the following corollary: **Corollary 1:** Religion increasing group cohesion allows the winning group to keep opponents out of the rent

Corollary 1: Religion increasing group cohesion allows the winning group to keep opponents out of the rent sharing, which leads to more fighting $(\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial \lambda} < 0)$; Caselli-Coleman effect). At the same time, religion may foster (in some contexts) alturism, which reduces the scope for fighting $(\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial \phi} < 0)$, Love-thy-neighbor effect). Finally, to the extent that religion fosters peaceful interaction between groups (in some contexts), it makes preferences more similar across groups and reduces the incentives for fighting $(\frac{\partial f_{i,j}}{\partial \gamma} < 0)$, Melting-pot effect).

Corollary 2: While the "Caselli-Coleman" effect is typically present in most contexts, the "Love-thy-neighbor" and "Melting pot" effects are mostly confined to situations of peaceful and non-discriminatory interaction, such as on pilgrimage routes, while absent in violent interactions such as during crusades. Hence, we expect past religious interaction to fuel persistent conflict potential on crusade routes, while potentially overall reducing tensions along pilgrimage routes.

B Additional Information on Data and Descriptive Statistics

In what follows we start off with Table A1 displaying summary statistics on crusade and pilgrimage routes at the country level. Next, we present Figure A1 which displays the share of elections in a year for which a jihadist attack (Panel a) and a child migrant death (Panel b) takes place before.

Country	Municipalities	% Crusade (10km)	% Pilgrims (10km)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Austria	2096	0.102	0.343
Belgium	208	0.000	0.298
Bulgaria	252	0.095	0.000
Czech Republic	5878	0.000	0.050
Denmark	90	0.000	0.000
Finland	389	0.000	0.000
France	35280	0.021	0.218
Germany	11246	0.045	0.298
Greece	282	0.089	0.050
Hungary	3139	0.047	0.068
Italy	8079	0.140	0.172
Luxembourg	116	0.000	0.060
Netherlands	458	0.000	0.421
Norway	357	0.000	0.000
Poland	2425	0.000	0.095
Portugal	304	0.000	0.122
Romania	3042	0.000	0.000
Slovakia	77	0.052	0.273
Spain	7996	0.000	0.128
Sweden	225	0.000	0.000
Switzerland	2113	0.097	0.358
United Kingdom	376	0.000	0.048

Table A1: Countries and Municipalities

Note: The Table reports the list of countries and the number of municipalities in our electoral data. Columns (3) and (4) provide the share of municipalities that lie within 10km from a Crusade or Pilgrimage route, respectively.

Figure A1: Jihadist Terrorist Attacks and Elections



(a) Jihadist Terrorist Attacks and Elections

Note. The Figure plots the share of elections in a given month that took place within 365 days from a Jihadist attack in which at least a country national died (Panel a). Panel b further shows the share of elections in a given month that occurred within 365 days of a child migrant's death.

C Robustness Analysis

In what follows, we will first investigate the sensitivity of the findings when considering the impact of all jihadist terror attacks, including the ones taking place on European soil. Figure A2 shows that our results are very similar for this more broadly defined exposure.

Next, we control for Roman roads, which could be an important confounder. As Roman roads were important trade routes for many centuries, in these places of business and inter-group contact one could expect a culture of tolerance arising. If pilgrimage routes correlate strongly with Roman road networks, maybe the effects we find for pilgrimage routes could simply spuriously reflect the impact of the underlying Roman roads. Figure A3 includes the interaction of terror exposure with proximity to Roman roads in the baseline specification. It is found that our main results on Crusade and Pilgrimage routes are unchanged, and proximity to Roman roads has, as expected, a small tension-reducing effect, in line with the tradition of business and inter-group contact on these major Medieval travel routes.

Morover, we investigate sensitivity to focusing on a tighter temporal window of attacks taking place withing 180 (instead of 365) days before the election. There is a trade-off: While a shorter time window may capture more salient attacks, at the same time it leads to a substantial loss of information and identifying variation. Figure A4 shows that our results are robust to this different specification.

Furthermore, in the spirit of a placebo exercise, we estimate the impact of non-jihadist terrorism, which we conjecture should not have the impact on reactivating Crusades-related inter-group hostility. Figure A5 shows that indeed any effects are quantitatively small, often insignificant and clustered around zero.

Moreover, we investigate demographic endogeneity in Figure A6, by adding all the main baseline characteristics interacted with the treatment variable *T*.



Figure A2: Including also attacks taking place in Europe

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a terrorist attack (either outside or inside Europe) occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, country by year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.



Figure A3: Controlling for Roman Roads

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals. The specification further include the differential effect of the shock by the distance to roman roads (i.e. within 10km from a roman road). The dummy *T* equals one if a terrorist attack occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, country by year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A4: Different timing: 180 days



(a) Baseline effect for 180 days

Note. Panel a reports estimates of the coefficient β_1 of equation 1, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a terrorist attack occurred within 180 days from election date *t*. Panel b of plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals.



Figure A5: Non-Jihadist Terrorism

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a non-jihadist terrorist attack occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, country by year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.



Figure A6: Demographic endogeneity

Note. This Figure plots estimates of the coefficient β_2 and β_3 of equation 2, i.e. the differential effects of proximity to Crusade and Pilgrimage, along with 95% confidence intervals. The dummy *T* equals one if a terrorist attack occurred within a year from election date *t*. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, country by year fixed effects and baseline characteristics of the municipality interacted with election year dummies. The specification further includes the interaction between baseline characteristics of the municipality and the treatement dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

D Additional Tables

In what follows we display regressions tables corresponding to the key results of the paper that are displayed graphically in the main text.

	ln Pop	ln GDP pc	Urban	Foreign Born	% Pop < 15	% Pop > 60
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Crusades (10km)	0.632***	0.392***	0.494***	1.065***	-0.150**	0.019
	(0.176)	(0.058)	(0.114)	(0.255)	(0.058)	(0.074)
Piglrims (10km)	0.559***	0.190***	0.193	0.563***	-0.097*	-0.051
5	(0.132)	(0.053)	(0.123)	(0.185)	(0.056)	(0.041)
T-test (p-values)	.793	.032	.152	.143	.468	.14
% Crusade	.035	.034	.035	.023	.034	.034
% Pilgrims	.19	.188	.189	.209	.187	.187
Observations	84,428	81,031	79,459	63,064	81,018	81,018

Table A2: Balancing - Socio-Demographic

Note: The Table reports estimates of the coefficients presented in Figure 5a (Panel A).

	Cathedral	Bishopric	Patron	Patron	Crusader
		1	Crusader	Pilgrim	Origin
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Crusade (10km)	0.267***	0.243***	0.061***	-0.013	0.144**
	(0.042)	(0.056)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.058)
Pilgrims (10km)	0.260***	0.139***	-0.042***	0.029*	0.036
0	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.032)
Ttost	010	11/	0	023	111
1-lest	.919	.114	1 - 000	.023	.111
Observations	49,681	84,428	15,280	15,280	84,428

Note: The Table reports estimates of the coefficients presented in Figure 5a (Panel B).

	Share Churches - Crusader Saint	Share Churches - Pilgrim Saint
	(1)	(2)
$800 \times Crusade$	-0.010	-0.086*
	(0.011)	(0.044)
$1000 \times Crusade$	0.075**	-0.165***
	(0.029)	(0.055)
$1100 \times Crusade$	0.066***	-0.221***
	(0.025)	(0.063)
$1200 \times Crusade$	0.054***	-0.217***
	(0.020)	(0.063)
$1300 \times Crusade$	0.054***	-0.238***
	(0.020)	(0.066)
$1400 \times Crusade$	0.056***	-0.214***
	(0.020)	(0.068)
$800 \times \text{Pilgrims}$	0.010	-0.058*
	(0.010)	(0.032)
$1000 \times \text{Pilgrims}$	0.025*	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.030)
$1100 \times \text{Pilgrims}$	0.012	0.097***
	(0.015)	(0.036)
$1200 \times \text{Pilgrims}$	0.010	0.080**
	(0.014)	(0.036)
$1300 \times \text{Pilgrims}$	0.010	0.087**
	(0.014)	(0.035)
$1400 \times \text{Pilgrims}$	0.012	0.077**
-	(0.014)	(0.037)
Observations	35,600	35,600

Table A4: Crusades and Pilgrimages Routes: Church Building

Note: The Table reports estimates of the coefficients presented in Figure 6a and Figure 6b.

	Immi	Immigration Multiculturalism		Ethnic	Ethnic Minor.		o Right	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat	0.019***		0.009**		0.024***		0.016***	
	(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.003)	
Treat \times Crusade (10km)		0.007***		0.006***		0.005***		0.007***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Treat \times Pilgrims (10km)		-0.004***		-0.006***		-0.004***		-0.005***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline \times Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country \times Year	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593

Table A5: Terror attacks exposure and Voting

Note: The Table reports estimates of the coefficients presented in Figure 7 and Figure 8

Table A6: Migrant Deaths and Voting

	Immig	Immigration Multiculturalism		Ethnic Minor.		Left to Right		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat	-0.032***		-0.015***		-0.061***		-0.012***	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Treat $ imes$ Crusade (10km)		0.008***		0.005*		0.005		0.006*
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Treat $ imes$ Pilgrims (10km)		-0.003*		-0.004**		-0.002		-0.003*
		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline \times Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country \times Year	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593	257,593

Note: The Table reports estimates of the coefficients presented in Figure 9 and Figure 10

Table A	A7: 1	LITS
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People you do not want as neighbors						
	Immigr.	Diff Relig.	Diff Lang	Diff race		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Panel A: Descriptives						
Crusade (10km)	0.018	0.034***	0.020*	0.036**		
	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)		
Pilgrims (10km)	-0.039**	-0.009	-0.003	-0.018		
-	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)		
Observations	19,092	19,092	19,092	19,092		
Panel B: 2010 vs. 2016						
Treat	0.193***	-0.012	-0.016*	0.012		
	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.013)		
Treat \times Crusade (10km)	-0.024	0.041**	0.026	0.040		
	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.026)		
Treat \times Pilgrims (10km)	-0.101***	-0.019	0.001	-0.061***		
	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.022)		
Panel C: 2016 attack						
Treat	-0.040	0.028	-0.051**	-0.055**		
	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.023)		
Treat \times Crusade (10km)	0.132**	-0.003	0.155*	0.084*		
	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.078)	(0.050)		
Treat \times Pilgrims (10km)	-0.101*	-0.072**	-0.037	-0.026		
	(0.060)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.032)		

Note: The Table reports estimates of the coefficients presented in Figure 11 (Panel A), Figure 12, and Figure 13.