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Registering to Donate

Matej Lorko
Maroš Servátka
Robert Slonim

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Matej Lorko,[a] Maroš Servátka,[b] and Robert Slonim [c]

Abstract: Many charitable organizations invite potential donors to first join a registry before soliciting donations from those who have joined. Behavioral theories suggest that the choice architecture of registry enrollment can influence not just participation but also future giving. Some approaches may be relatively more likely to increase the likelihood of joining but reduce the subsequent propensity to donate and the amount donated, while other methods might have the opposite effect. We experimentally test four behavioral theories – overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, and moral consistency – in a two-stage donor engagement model. We find that (1) disclosing registry-related overhead costs decreases donations, (2) changing the default enrollment method (op-in vs. opt-out) does not affect enrollment nor donations, (3) targeting reciprocity by offering a small gift conditional on joining the registry boosts enrollment but not donations, and (4) targeting moral consistency by requesting an upfront contribution does not decrease the likelihood of joining the registry and improves charity returns. Our findings emphasize how subtle differences in early-stage donor approach design can influence longer-term fundraising outcomes.

Keywords: charitable giving, donor registry, overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, moral consistency, experiment

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[a] Corresponding author, Matej Lorko, Faculty of Economics and Finance, University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovakia, and Faculty of Business Administration, Prague University of Economics and Business, Czech Republic. matej.lorko@gmail.com
[b] Maroš Servátka, MQBS Experimental Economics Laboratory, Macquarie Business School, Sydney, Australia, and the University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovakia. maros.servatka@mgsm.edu.au
[c] Robert Slonim, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia. robert.slonim@uts.edu.au

1. Introduction

Many charitable organizations collect donations from donors who have joined a charity's registry or mailing list (Heger, Slonim, Garbarino, Wang, & Waller, 2020). The collection thus consists of two stages. The charitable organization first initiates the relationship with potential donors by asking them to join the registry and later solicits donations from those who joined. Most research on charitable giving focuses on a single donation request by studying factors that can affect donations at the moment of solicitation (Vesterlund, 2016; Saeri et al, 2023). This study examines how the propensity to donate and donation amounts may depend on different theory-guided approaches to registry enrollment.

From the charitable organization's perspective, registry enrollment may involve two potentially conflicting goals. On the one hand, the organization aims to attract as many potential donors as possible to join the registry to call upon them in the future when help is needed. On the other hand, given the costs associated with enrolling potential donors and subsequent solicitations (e.g., snail mail and phone call staff time), a charity inviting people to join the registry would like to avoid enrollment of those who will never donate in the future or whose contributions will be too low relative to the costs. Hence, an efficient registry enrollment choice architecture does not necessarily maximize the enrollment rate but rather the enrollment of people who will subsequently make donations.

Existing research shows that registries can improve the coordination of supply and demand for voluntary activities (Slonim & Wang, 2021), reduce donor attrition (Haylock et al., 2024), and serve as a cost-effective mechanism for regaining lost donors (Heger et al., 2020). We add to this emerging literature by experimentally testing the implications of four behavioral theories on registry enrollment and subsequent donations. The theories we test are overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, and moral consistency. The tested theories are grounded in existing practices by charitable organizations and have received empirical support in environments with single donation solicitation. Our contribution stems from applying the theories to a multi-step setup in which they have not been tested previously, but in which they can offer both theoretical insights and practical recommendations.

Our experiment addresses the following research questions, motivated by the respective theories explained in section 2 below:

(1) *Overhead Aversion*: Does informing potential donors of registry overhead costs decrease donation propensities and amounts?

(2) *Status Quo Bias*: Does requiring donors to opt-in to the registry lead to lower enrollment but higher donation propensities and amounts than enrolling the donor in the registry by default with an option to opt-out?
(3) *Reciprocity*: Does providing a small gift to a potential donor for enrolling increase the enrollment rate but decrease donation propensities and amounts?
(4) *Moral Consistency*: Does asking a potential donor to cover registry-related overhead costs upfront decrease the enrollment rate but increase donation propensities and amounts?

To answer our research questions, we conduct an online experiment in which we create a simple registry (Slonim & Wang, 2021) and vary the registry enrollment stage across subjects. In two baseline treatments, enrollment is forced, and either includes information about overhead costs or does not. In four other treatments, subjects have the option to enroll in the registry. Depending on the treatment, voluntary enrollment involves a gift from the charity or to the charity, or is absent of any gifts. The enrollment stage is followed by four donation solicitation stages, separated by a few weeks. In each solicitation stage, subjects are assigned monetary endowments, and those enrolled in the registry decide how much to donate to a charity and how much to keep for themselves. Any donations are matched.

We find that informing donors of registry-related overhead costs decreases donation amounts. Contrary to typical results from existing studies on status quo bias, we find no statistically significant differences in behavior in any of our measures (i.e., the registry enrollment rate, donation propensity, and donation amount) between the opt-in and opt-out approach. We also find that targeting reciprocity by providing a conditional gift from the charity to a potential donor significantly increases the likelihood of registry enrollment but yields a significantly lower overall return to the charity compared to targeting moral consistency by requiring a gift from the donor to enroll. Thus, reciprocity in registry enrollment seems to be less powerful than moral consistency, a novel empirical insight with practical implications that is not readily available from simple experimental environments without a registry or from field data. Finally, we observe that donations do not decay over time in any of our treatments, even if solicitation occurs for the same cause twice, providing further support for moral consistency in giving.

2. Hypotheses

This section reviews the literature on overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, and moral consistency and derives testable hypotheses for our experimental design.

2.1 Overhead aversion

Charities often require substantial administrative and fundraising costs. Research finds that donors donate less if charities use their donations to cover overhead costs (Abraham, Corazzini, Fišar, & Reggiani, 2023; Caviola et. al, 2014; Hung, Hager, & Tian, 2023; Meer, 2014; Portillo & Stinn, 2018). In addition, Gneezy, Keenan, & Gneezy (2014) show that when donors are informed that overhead costs are already covered, their donations significantly increase. We add to this literature by testing the effects of overhead aversion in a registry context. Enrolling people in the registry incurs inevitable overheads, and therefore, it is crucial to understand whether their salience influences donor behavior. Given the general dislike of overhead costs, we hypothesize that donors will exhibit overhead aversion to running the registry, which will manifest in lower donations.

> ***Hypothesis 1:*** *Disclosing the overhead costs of enrolling in a donor registry will lower donations.*

2.2 Status quo bias

Status quo bias research (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) finds that enrollment is higher when people have to opt out of rather than opt in to a program. This result has been found in many domains including, for example, healthcare (Bellman, Johnson, & Lohse, 2001), organ donations (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), retirement savings (Madrian & Shea, 2001), vaccinations (Asch et al., 1994), electricity pricing programs (Fowlie et al., 2021) and internal promotions (Erkal, Gangadharan, & Xiao, 2022).

Less is known, however, about follow-up behavior in general and with regard to charitable donations in particular. If subsequent donations do not depend on how people were enrolled, then setting the default so that people are enrolled and have to opt out will result in more donations. The assumption that subsequent donations do not depend on enrollment has, however, been questioned. For instance, Gaudeul & Kaczmarek (2022) find that individuals who did not opt out of the donation pledge give less than those who had opted into a pledge. The net effect on donations of having donors opt out of a donor registry rather than having to opt into the registry is ambiguous since more donors are hypothesized to join, but they may

subsequently give less. Given this ambiguity, our second hypothesis only refers to registry enrollment:

> ***Hypothesis 2:*** *An opt-out enrollment process will increase registry enrollment compared to the opt-in process. The effect on donations is ambiguous.*

2.3 Reciprocity

The evidence of reciprocity to increase donations in environments without a registry is inconclusive. Falk (2007) shows that including a gift in a solicitation letter leads to a significant, albeit only immediate, increase in the number of donations and the donation amount. Similarly, Garbarino, Slonim, & Wang (2013) find that an unconditional gift (specifically, a pen) increases blood donations. However, Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-Stenman (2008) find that gifts increase the willingness to donate only marginally and that, importantly, gift costs exceed additional donations, making gift-giving unprofitable for the charitable organization. Yin, Li, & Singh (2020) also find gifts, especially monetary ones, to be unprofitable.[1] In addition, Newman & Jeremy Shen (2012) show the negative effects of anticipated thank-you gifts on donation amounts and suggest that gifts crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) to donate.

We examine positive reciprocity in the context of offering a gift conditional on joining the registry. To the extent that potential donors interpret the gift for joining the registry as a kind action from the charity, a preference for reciprocity predicts that the gift for joining will increase subsequent donations.[2] On the other hand, to the extent that a gift attracts individuals to join the registry to receive the gift but does not affect reciprocity preferences, the propensity to join the registry will be higher, and subsequent donations will be lower among those who joined the registry, as the pool of registry members will include a mixture of people who joined the registry to donate with others who were motivated by the gift.

> ***Hypothesis 3:*** *Providing a gift from a charity to a potential donor to join the registry increases the registry enrollment rate, but it is ambiguous whether donations will increase or decrease.*

[1] In a similar vein, Kube, Maréchal, & Puppe (2012) show that in a work environment, non-monetary gifts elicit stronger reciprocity than equivalent cash gifts.

[2] For models of reciprocity, see Cox, Sadiraj, & Sadiraj (2008) and Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004). While experiments show that reciprocity depends on the perceived intentions (e.g., Charness, 2004), if one interprets the conditional gift as self-serving behavior to entice the donor to join the registry (and the charity gaining more than the donor, which is debatable), such "self-servingness" has been shown not to diminish the reciprocal response to kind actions (Woods & Servátka, 2019).

2.4 Moral consistency

A growing body of literature explores the impact of interventions, designed to target immediate behavior, also on future altruistic behavior (Cairns & Slonim, 2011; Lorko, Servátka, Slonim, & Ďuriník, 2024; Shang & Croson, 2009). For example, Heger & Slonim (2022) find that an increase in immediate giving caused by a nudge leads to an increase in later giving, and interpret their findings as a manifestation of moral consistency (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990).[3] In the current study, moral consistency predicts that paying to join the registry will increase the probability of donating later (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011).[4] However, requiring a payment to join a registry is also expected to reduce the number of people who will join, as the payment increases the cost of donating (Craig, Garbarino, Heger, & Slonim, 2017). Thus, the overall effect of requiring payment to join a registry on future donations is ambiguous because it is predicted to reduce the number of people who join but, due to moral consistency, it is expected to increase donations among those who do join.

> ***Hypothesis 4:*** *Requesting an initial contribution from a donor will decrease registry enrollment but increase the donations among those who join.*

3. Experimental design

We conduct an online experiment consisting of an initial donor registry enrollment stage followed by four donation solicitation stages. Subjects are given seven days to make their decisions in each stage. Stages are separated by three weeks, meaning that each stage starts exactly 21 days after the start of the previous stage, or in other words, exactly 14 days after the previous stage closes. A timeline of the experiment is presented in Figure 1.

Implementing a controlled experiment with a student sample, monetary endowments, and charity as a recipient (instead of a field experiment conducted by the charity itself) mitigates potential confounds related to the relationship with the charity and past donations (less than 8 percent of our subjects indicated that they were familiar with the selected charity before the

[3] Based on Bem's (1972) self-perception theory and its economics formalization by Bénabou & Tirole (2011), Heger & Slonim (2022) model moral consistency in altruism as habit-persistent charitable giving where an increase in past giving causes an increase in giving today.

[4] Paying to join the registry is a costly act of commission (Cox, Servátka, & Vadovič, 2017) that allows one to make inferences in the future about their identity (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011). Joining the registry conceptually resembles donation pledges that may increase donations, especially if the charity shows appreciation to the pledging individual (Andreoni & Serra-Garcia, 2021a). However, pledges do not seem to increase volunteering rates (Capra, Jiang, & Su, 2022).

experiment) and reduces subject attrition.[5] The experimental design recreates the essential features of the donation process in the presence of a registry, offering a high degree of control in these rudimentary conditions that would not be available in the field. Crucially, it presents an internally valid empirical test of the hypotheses derived from the underlying theories.

Figure 1: Timeline of the experiment



Notes. Dark shade indicates subject actions, while light shade indicates experimenter actions.

Registry enrollment stage

In the registry enrollment stage, subjects are informed of all stages and their timing and watch a short video introducing the charity collecting the donations in the experiment. We selected the Integra Foundation, a relatively small Slovak-based organization that runs sustainable development and humanitarian projects, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine. The enrollment stage is where the treatment manipulation occurs. Based on the treatment, subjects learn about their own and the charity's enrollment stage endowments and are either informed about being enrolled in our donor registry by default or about their choice to enroll in the registry or not. Subjects also learn that the donor registry is anonymous and will be used only for experimental purposes. Subjects' email addresses or other personal information are never shared with the charity. Finally, subjects are informed about their future endowments in the subsequent four solicitation stages and about the possibility of using these endowments to donate to the charity, conditional on being enrolled in the registry. To encourage donations to the charity used in the experiment (rather than to one's own preferred charity outside the experiment), we provide a 1:1 match for every Euro donated.

[5] The response rates in our experiment were 98%, 98%, 95%, and 92% for the first, second, third, and fourth solicitation stage, respectively. With one, likely random exception (second solicitation stage, Paid-to-Join treatment), non-responses were distributed similarly across all treatments.

The experiment consists of six treatments implemented in the across-subject design, in which each subject is randomly assigned to one and only one treatment.

- In the **Forced** treatment, subjects are informed about being enrolled in the registry by default.
- In the **Forced + Overhead Costs** (Forced+OC) treatment, subjects are informed about being enrolled in the registry by default and of the EUR 2 overhead costs associated with the enrollment, incurred by the charity.
- In the **Opt-Out** treatment, subjects are informed about being enrolled in the registry by default and about the choice to either *stay* in the registry, in which case the charity incurs the EUR 2 overhead costs or to *leave* the registry, in which case the overhead costs are void.[6]
- In the **Opt-In** treatment, subjects are informed about the choice to either *join* the registry, in which case the charity incurs the EUR 2 overhead costs or *not join* the registry, in which case the overhead costs are void.
- In the **Pay-to-Join** treatment, subjects are informed about the choice to either join the registry, which requires a EUR 2 gift *from the subject to the charity* to cover the EUR 2 overhead costs, or not join the registry, in which case there is no gift, and the overhead costs are void.
- In the **Paid-to-Join** treatment, subjects are informed about the choice to either join the registry, which results in a EUR 2 gift *from the charity to the subject* and with EUR 2 overhead costs incurred by the charity, or not join the registry, in which case there is no gift, and the overhead costs are void.[7]

A comparison of the two Forced treatments lets us test Hypothesis 1 regarding the overhead aversion. We explore the status quo bias described in Hypothesis 2 by comparing the Opt-Out treatment and the Opt-In treatment. A comparison of the Paid-to-Join treatment and the Opt-In treatment tests Hypothesis 3 regarding reciprocity, while a comparison of the Pay-to-Join treatment and the Opt-In treatment tests Hypothesis 4 regarding moral consistency.[8]

[6] We implement (and inform of) the overhead costs in the Opt-Out, Opt-In, Pay-to-Join, and Paid-to-Join treatments to make the registry enrollment decision economically relevant even for subjects who do not intend to make any donations.

[7] We choose to implement a conditional rather than unconditional gift to parallel the outside- the-lab environment in which charities usually give gifts to potential donors (e.g., in the form of merchandise items) only after the individual provides the charity with her contact information, subscribes to the charity mailing list, or starts following the charity on social media.

[8] Since we found no statistically significant differences between the Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments, we pool them together for the purposes of testing Hypotheses 3 and 4 to increase the statistical power.

Finally, the relative effects of targeting reciprocity vs. targeting moral consistency are revealed by comparing the Paid-to-Join treatment and the Pay-to-Join treatment.

The registry enrollment stage endowments and resulting payoffs are detailed in Table 1. Subjects in all treatments are informed that their (forced or voluntary) enrollment or non-enrollment in the registry is final and that there is no option to join or leave the registry in the following stages.[9] Additionally, subjects in the respective treatments are informed that the following stages do not feature any overhead costs or automatic gifts.

Table 1: The enrollment stage endowments (in EUR) and payoffs by treatment

Treatment	Endowments		Subject Choice	Payoffs if enrolled		Payoffs if not enrolled	
	Subject	Charity		Subject	Charity	Subject	Charity
Forced	5	2*	No choice	5	0	-	-
Forced+OC	5	2	No choice	5	0	-	-
Opt-Out	5	2	Stay / Leave	5	0	5	2
Opt-In	5	2	Join / Not join	5	0	5	2
Pay-to-Join	7	0	Pay 2 to join / Not join	5	0	7	0
Paid-to-Join	3	4	Get paid 2 to join / Not join	5	0	3	4

Notes. *: In the Forced treatment, subjects are not informed of the charity endowment and the overhead costs.

Four donation solicitation stages

In each of the four donation solicitation stages, subjects are given seven days to claim their EUR 5 endowment. For non-enrolled subjects, the stage ends after the endowment is claimed. Subjects enrolled in the registry are reminded about how they enrolled and presented with an opportunity to use the claimed endowment for a donation toward a specific charitable cause, briefly described by a mission and impact statement, along with a few accompanying pictures. Subjects are reminded that they can choose to donate any integer amount from EUR 0 to EUR 5 and that the experimenters will double their donation.

We solicit donations for three different causes. Cause 1 supports planting macadamia trees on small family farms in Ethiopia, Cause 2 supports the construction of an orphanage in Nairobi, Kenya, and Cause 3 refers to humanitarian support in a small Ukrainian village near the Russian border. In the first three donation solicitation stages, each subject is presented with each cause once. To avoid an order effect, we create six distinct orderings of the three causes (C1-C3), and assign one of these orderings to each enrolled subject so that in each stage in each treatment, approximately one-third of the enrolled subjects is presented with C1, one-third with C2, and one-third with C3. In the final donation solicitation stage, we present all subjects with

[9] We implemented the non-enrollment as irreversible to mimic the outside- the lab environment in which a person who declines an invitation to join a donor registry is usually not approached by the charity again.

C2 to examine the effect of repeated solicitation for the same cause and whether the time gap between two solicitations for the same cause matters.

Procedures

We conducted the experiment using our in-house developed web application. Subjects, all students at the University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovakia, were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). To participate in the experiment, subjects had to sign up to the website using their university email address, fill out a short demographic questionnaire (age, gender, faculty, year of study, employment status, and average weekly spending), provide their bank account number for payment purposes, and participation consent.

After reading the registry enrollment stage instructions, subjects completed ten comprehension questions for which one randomly selected subject would be paid EUR 3 for every correct answer. At the end of the enrollment stage, subjects answered a few questions about their familiarity with and impressions of the used charity, and about their general charitable giving behavior, and filled out the Attitudes Towards Charitable Giving questionnaire (Furnham, 1995).

We bank-transferred the payments to the subjects and the charity after each stage. Subjects were informed about the start of each stage via email. For those who did not respond, reminders about when the stage closes were always sent 4 days before the deadline, 2 days before the deadline, and at the deadline.

At the end of the experiment, subjects provided open-ended feedback on their decisions. Finally, all subjects participating in the experiment received an email disclosing the total donations for each cause, and a thank-you note from the charity confirming that all donations made in the experiment were received.

Subjects

A total of 409 subjects participated in the experiment. The treatments were balanced in terms of age and gender, with a mean age of 21.8 years and a 58% female representation in the whole sample. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of our six treatments. We opted for a smaller sample size in the two baseline treatments with forced enrollment (59 and 62 subjects, respectively) compared to the other four treatments (between 70 and 75 subjects) to balance our treatments in terms of the number of subjects enrolled in the registry. According to G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007), our sample gives us 80% statistical power (with 5% error probability) to detect medium effect sizes in pairwise treatment comparisons and small

effect sizes in the regression analysis. The average subject total payoff from all stages (including the enrollment stage) yielded EUR 15.91, while the average total donation per subject (irrespective of whether the subject was enrolled or not), including our match, yielded EUR 16.86.

4. Results

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Panel A shows the number of subjects for each treatment, the number of subjects enrolled in the registry, the number of subjects not enrolled, and the resulting enrollment rate.[10] Panel B summarizes subject choices by treatment for all treated subjects, while Panel C summarizes choices of enrolled subjects only. Our measures include the donation rate and mean donation amount in the first solicitation stage, the rate of at least one positive donation throughout all four solicitation stages, the mean number of donations, the mean total donation from all stages, and the mean return to charity, in which overhead costs and gifts paid by the charity are subtracted from the total donation.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Panel A: Enrollment rates by treatment						
Treatment	Forced	Forced+OC	Opt-Out	Opt-In	Pay-to-Join	Paid-to-Join
Number of subjects (N)	59	62	75	73	70	70
Enrolled in registry	59	62	59	53	51	62
Not enrolled in registry	0	0	16	20	19	8
Enrollment rate	100%	100%	79%	73%	73%	89%
Panel B: Decisions of all subjects						
Positive donation (1st solicitation)	75%	76%	73%	66%	64%	70%
Positive donation at least once	85%	87%	77%	71%	73%	77%
Mean number of donations	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.6
Mean donation (1st solicitation)	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9
Mean total donation (all stages)	10.7	8.2	8.0	7.8	8.0	7.5
Mean return to charity	19.4	14.4	14.5	14.1	16.0	11.5
Panel C: Decisions of subjects enrolled in the registry						
Positive donation (1st solicitation)	75%	76%	93%	91%	88%	79%
Positive donation at least once	85%	87%	98%	98%	100%	87%
Mean number of donations	2.9	2.6	3.4	3.5	3.5	2.9
Mean donation (1st solicitation)	2.6	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.2
Mean total donation (all stages)	10.7	8.2	10.2	10.7	11.0	8.5
Mean return to charity	19.4	14.4	18.4	19.5	21.9	13.0

Notes. Donation amounts (in EUR) do not include our match. Return to charity includes our match, overhead costs, and the gifts paid by the charity (in the Paid-to-Join treatment).

[10] In addition to analyzing enrolment rates, we also analyze potential selection effects of demographics and other control variables in registry enrolment within each treatment. However, we find no significant effects. For example, Person's chi-square test shows no significant differences in enrollment for males vs. females in any treatment (p-value = 0.36, 0.43, 0.74, 0.81 for Opt-Out, Opt-In, Pay-to-Join and Paid-to-Join treatment, respectively).

Figure 2 compares the treatments by donation rate and mean cumulative donation over the four solicitation stages. Solid lines represent all subjects in a treatment while dashed lines represent only those enrolled in the registry. The first column compares the Forced (red) and Forced+OC (blue) treatments, the second column compares the Opt-Out (red) and Opt-In (blue) treatments, and the third column compares the Pay-to-Join (blue) and Paid-to-Join (red) treatments. Visual inspection suggests that informing subjects of overhead costs in the Forced+OC treatment yields lower donations compared to the Forced treatment. The figure also shows that the Pay-to-Join treatment generates more giving for subjects who joined the registry than the Paid-to-Join treatment. This observation is supported by Table 2 statistics, showing that 100% of those who joined the registry in the Pay-to-Join treatment decided to give at least once, while in the Paid-to-Join treatment, 13% of subjects who joined the registry did not give anything. Finally, the figure shows modest (if any) differences in subject behavior between the Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments.

Figure 2: Donation rate and mean cumulative donation by treatment



Notes. Solid lines represent all treated subjects while dashed lines represent subjects enrolled in the registry.

Overhead aversion

To test Hypothesis 1, which states that disclosing overhead costs associated with donor registry enrollment results in fewer donations, we run two regression models presented in Table 3.[11] The regressions compare the baseline Forced treatment with the Forced+OC treatment, in which subjects are informed of overhead costs. We find that mentioning registry-related overhead costs has an insignificant negative effect on the number of donations (Model 1), as well as on the mean total donation (Model 2).

As a robustness check, we compare the mean total donation in the Forced treatment, i.e., the only treatment in which the overhead costs were never mentioned (EUR 10.7 without our match) to the mean total donation in all five other treatments pooled together (EUR 7.9). We find that the mean total donation in the Forced treatment is significantly higher (Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.01), providing further support for Hypothesis 1 concerning the overhead aversion.

Result 1: *Informing potential donors of overhead costs related to donor registry enrollment decreases total donations.*

Table 3: Regression outcomes comparing the Forced and Forced+OC treatments

	(1) Number of donations	(2) Total donation
Regression model	OLS	Tobit
Baseline treatment	Forced	Forced
Baseline value	2.92	10.69
Informed of overhead costs	-0.30 (0.27)	-2.81 (1.68)
Constant	2.92*** (0.19)	10.82*** (1.28)
No. of left-censored observations		17
No. of right-censored observations		17
N	121	121

Notes. Donation amounts (in EUR) do not include our match. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%-level, respectively.

[11] In Tables 3 and 4, we present OLS models for the number of donations instead of Tobit models because OLS coefficients are more straightforward to interpret. Both models yield qualitatively similar outcomes. Regressions controlling for demographics (gender, employment, weekly spending, frequency of charitable behavior, and familiarity with the charity before the experiment) yield identical conclusions with respect to treatment effects, and are included in the Appendix, Tables A1 and A2.

Status quo bias

Next, we test Hypothesis 2, which states that the Opt-Out treatment will result in a higher registry enrollment rate than the Opt-In treatment; and analyze the subsequent donations in these two treatments. Table 4 presents regressions that compare the Opt-Out, Opt-In, Pay-to-Join, and Paid-to-Join treatments to the Forced+OC treatment representing a baseline. All five specified models yield similar coefficients for the Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments. The p-values of post-estimation tests, presented at the bottom of the table, indicate no statistically significant differences in any of our measures between the Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments, jointly suggesting no effects of default options.

We also run a robustness check, in which we consider subjects in both Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments as "not enrolled by default" (and therefore technically in the opt-in scenario) and compare their behavior to that of subjects in the Forced+OC treatment, who were "enrolled by default". While subjects in the Forced+OC treatment could not opt out of the registry explicitly, they could opt out implicitly by not donating. In this alternative analysis, we also find no statistically significant difference between the Forced+OC treatment and pooled Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments in mean number of donations (2.6 vs. 2.6, Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.60) and mean total donation (EUR 8.2 vs. EUR 7.9, Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.60).

Result 2: *There is no statistically significant difference in the enrollment rate and subsequent giving between the opt-out and opt-in registry enrollment.*

Table 4: Regression outcomes comparing all treatments except for Forced treatment

	All subjects			Enrolled subjects only	
	(1) Joined	(2) Number of donations	(3) Total donation	(4) Number of donations	(5) Total donation
Regression model	OLS	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
Baseline treatment	F+OC	F+OC	F+OC	F+OC	F+OC
Baseline value	1.00	2.61	8.18	2.61	8.18
Opt-Out	-0.21***	0.05	-0.84	0.78***	2.54
	(0.05)	(0.27)	(1.63)	(0.23)	(1.39)
Opt-In	-0.27***	-0.06	-1.47	0.90***	3.13*
	(0.05)	(0.28)	(1.70)	(0.22)	(1.41)
Pay-to-join	-0.27***	-0.07	-0.99	0.88***	3.60*
	(0.05)	(0.28)	(1.73)	(0.22)	(1.45)
Paid-to-join	-0.11**	-0.04	-1.15	0.29	0.50
	(0.04)	(0.27)	(1.69)	(0.26)	(1.52)
Constant	1.00***	2.61***	8.00***	2.61***	8.04***
	(0.00)	(0.18)	(1.13)	(0.18)	(1.03)
No. of left-censored			81		18
No. of right-censored			40		40
	Post-estimation test p-values				
Opt-Out vs. Opt-in	0.39	0.68	0.72	0.52	0.66
Pay-to-Join vs. Paid-to-Join	0.02	0.92	0.93	0.01	0.04
N	350	350	350	287	287

Notes. Donation amounts (in EUR) do not include our match. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%-level, respectively.

Reciprocity and moral consistency

Hypothesis 3 states that a gift from the charity to the potential donor in the enrollment stage increases the registry enrollment rate but does not necessarily increase donations. Comparing our Paid-to-Join treatment with pooled Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments, in which enrolling in the registry is voluntary and includes no gift from the charity, we indeed find that the enrollment rate in the Paid-to-Join treatment is significantly higher (89% vs. 76%, Pearson's chi-square test p-value = 0.03). Although the mean total donations are similar (EUR 7.5 vs. EUR 7.9, Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.78), due to additional gift costs, the Paid-to-Join treatment yields insignificantly lower charity return on approached donor (EUR 11.5 vs. EUR 14.3, Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.10). In line with previous research, we find that giving gifts to potential donors may be unprofitable for the charitable organization.

Result 3: *Providing an initial gift from the charity to a potential donor increases the likelihood of joining the charity donor registry but does not increase donations. Considering the gift costs, the charity return on the approached donor is lower with gift-giving than without.*

Hypothesis 4 relates to moral consistency and states that requesting an initial gift from the potential donor to cover registry-related overhead costs in the enrollment stage decreases the registry enrollment rate but increases the donations of enrolled donors. We compare our Pay-to-Join treatment to pooled Opt-Out and Opt-In treatments but find no support for Hypothesis 4. The enrollment rate (73% vs. 76%, Pearson's chi-square test p-value = 0.66) and the mean total donation (EUR 8.0 vs. EUR 7.9, Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.99 for all subjects, and EUR 11.0 vs. EUR 10.5, Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.63 for enrolled subjects only) yield no statistically significant differences.

Result 4: *Requesting an initial gift from the donor to cover registry-related overhead costs does not decrease the likelihood of joining the charity donor registry or affect the donations.*

By comparing the outcomes in the Paid-to-Join treatment to the Pay-to-Join treatment, we analyze the relative effects of targeting reciprocity against targeting moral consistency. In line with our previous findings, p-values of post-estimation tests included in Table 4 show that being in the Paid-to-Join treatment significantly increases the registry enrollment rate (Model 1, 89% in Paid-to-Join, vs. 73% in Pay-to-Join, p = 0.02). Although we observe similar mean total donations in the two treatments (Model 3, p = 0.93), the Pay-to-Join treatment yields a significantly higher return to the charity (EUR 16.0 vs. EUR 11.5, Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.04) due to significantly higher donations of those who joined the registry (Model 5, p = 0.04), and also because the Pay-to-Join treatment eliminates overhead costs incurred by the charity. In the Paid-to-join treatment, the charity not only covers the registry-related overhead costs but also bears the gift costs.

(Additional) Result 5: *While providing an initial gift to a potential donor increases the registry enrollment rate, requesting a gift increases the donations of enrolled donors. Coupled with the gift costs, the charity return on approached donor is higher when a gift is requested than when it is provided.*

Auxiliary analysis on consistency in giving

Finally, we take advantage of our experimental design consisting of repeated solicitations to examine whether donations decay or remain similar across time (i.e., across the four solicitation stages) and across multiple solicitations for the same cause. For identification purposes, we only include subjects enrolled in the registry. Pooling all treatments together (see the left panel of Figure 3 for a graphical representation), we find similar mean donations across time (EUR 2.4, EUR 2.4, EUR 2.6, and EUR 2.4 in the first, second, third and fourth solicitation stage, respectively), yielding no significant differences between stages (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test p-values = 0.84, 0.08, and 0.38 for the comparison of the first vs. second, second vs. third, and third vs. fourth solicitation stage, respectively). In addition, we find similar giving in the across-time analysis for each treatment. Thus, we do not find any signs of decay in donations. If anything, we observe a slight increase (albeit probably by chance) in the third solicitation.

Recall that in the last donation solicitation stage, we repeated solicitation for the construction of the Nairobi orphanage (Cause 2) to investigate the consistency in giving, and the impact of the time gap between two solicitations for the same cause. Pooling all treatments together, we find that donations towards the Nairobi orphanage in the first solicitation are similar to the second solicitation (EUR 2.6 vs. EUR 2.4, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test p-value = 0.16). The time gap between solicitations does not play a role, as the mean second donation is similar to the mean first donation, irrespective of whether the first solicitation occurred nine (EUR 2.7 in the first solicitation vs. EUR 2.3 in the second solicitation), six (EUR 2.6 vs. EUR 2.5) or three (EUR 2.5 vs. EUR 2.5) weeks before the second one (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test p-values = 0.08, 0.71, and 0.86, respectively). Although the p-value of 0.08 might suggest insignificantly negative effect, we note that this outcome is driven by the attrition of a few subjects in the last stage rather than by a change in subjects' donation preferences. Graphical representation is provided in the right panel of Figure 3.

(Additional) Result 6: *We find considerable consistency in giving. Donations do not decay over time and remain similar even across two solicitations for the same cause, regardless of the time gap between the solicitations.*

Figure 3: Mean donations of enrolled subjects, by solicitations



Notes. The donation amounts (in EUR) do not include our match.

5. Discussion

How should a charitable organization approach a potential donor? Andreoni & Serra-Garcia (2021b) and Breman (2011) show that charitable fundraising can be more effective if a potential donor is asked to commit to giving later rather than immediately. In this paper, we introduce an option to express interest in donating in the future by joining a charity donor registry and examine the implications of behavioral theories of overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, and moral consistency for registry design.

In line with the extant literature, we observe that people dislike charity overhead costs. Just mentioning the (relatively modest) donor registry-related overhead costs incurred by the charity leads to lower donation amounts. Although Gneezy et al. (2014) find that informing donors that the overhead costs had already been covered increases donations, our results suggest that charities should avoid mentioning their overhead costs in the enrollment stage.

Perhaps surprisingly, we also find no evidence of status quo bias in the enrollment process. Being enrolled or not enrolled in the registry by default, with the possibility to reverse the status quo does not appear to play a role in the likelihood of joining the registry and subsequent donations. We note that this result may not be accidental in the domain of charitable giving, as it is consistent with null effects found in a laboratory study (Fiala & Noussair, 2017) and a field study (Altmann et al., 2019), which tested whether suggested default amounts influence the mean donation. In addition, Zarghamee et al. (2017) find that a default to donate

experimental earnings results in lower donations than a refund default. It is also possible that the null effect is driven by our implementation of the opt-in and opt-out enrollment process, in which every subject must make an active decision (albeit under different framing) relative to remaining enrolled/not enrolled in the registry if no decision is made.

We also find that even though the approach of giving a small gift to a potential donor increases the enrollment rate, in line with previous findings, we observe that this approach is unprofitable from the charitable organization's perspective because the gift does not generate enough reciprocity to be fully paid back to the charity on top of non-reciprocal donations. We observe many subjects joining the registry, claiming the gift, and not reciprocating. Targeting reciprocity is less effective than requesting a gift upfront to cover the enrollment costs. Contrary to our expectations, targeting moral consistency by requesting an initial payment (which does not result in any tangible outcome for the charity unless it is followed by future donations) to cover the overhead costs does not decrease the enrollment rate and yields higher (albeit not always significantly) donations of those enrolled and mean charity return on approached donor than the remaining treatments with explicit overhead costs. While the enrollment rate likely depends on the payment size and may decrease if the requested amount is perceived as too large, we provide evidence that a reasonably modest request (which in the field can have different forms) can effectively screen out future non-givers and result in the enrollment of committed donors.

Finally, we find an impressive degree of consistency in giving, as evidenced by the fact that donations do not decay over time, and this holds true even for a second solicitation for the same cause. Our result resonates with Adena & Huck (2019), Landry, Lange, List, Price, & Rupp (2010), and Meer (2013) who show that the probability of giving in the future increases with the current giving. However, we note that our results could have been influenced by the donations being made from windfall rather than earned endowments or own money.

From a methodological perspective, our experiment tests theories applicable to registry enrollment and subsequent donations. It is worth noting that any experimental results (whether in the lab or field) do not generalize to other settings and are not intended to unless there is a particular theory about the generalization process. The main advantage of experiments is in testing falsifiable theories. Economic theories tend to be general and frequently specify only the most necessary environmental details, while abstracting from the institution of exchange. An experiment is an example of a theory and is also not meant to capture all the details of everyday life. If there is a suspicion that a specific environmental feature is missing from an experiment, one must first check whether that feature is described in the theory. If it is not, the

experiment presents a valid test. A key contribution of our research is selecting four theoretical ideas motivated by existing practices, deriving behavioral predictions in a stylized registry environment, and testing whether these predictions are borne out in the data, thereby enhancing our understanding of donor behavior.

We conclude with suggestions for future research. To complement our stylized environment, future experiments should examine the impact of the enrollment stage in a natural field setting. Furthermore, our design, driven by existing theories and practices, is not exhaustive. Different implementations of the enrollment stage will likely yield different results, and it would be worthwhile to examine which recruitment method to use in which conditions. Another important avenue for future research is to better understand the selection processes that occur during registry enrollment, what drives them, and how they interact with the recruitment method. Apart from theoretical insights, the research can yield practical implications for charitable organizations and improve donor welfare.

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Appendix

Table A1: Full regression outcomes comparing the Forced and Forced+OC treatments

	(1) Number of donations	(2) Total donation
Regression model	OLS	Tobit
Baseline treatment	Forced	Forced
Baseline value	2.92	10.69
Informed of overhead costs	-0.32 (0.27)	-2.93 (1.58)
Familiar with the charity	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.73 (0.50)
Donates/volunteers frequently	0.00 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.22)
Female	-0.06 (0.27)	-4.60** (1.70)
Currently working	0.05 (0.28)	1.47 (1.63)
Weekly spending	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.01)
Constant	3.33*** (0.47)	17.20*** (2.98)
No. of left-censored observations		17
No. of right-censored observations		17
N	121	121

Notes. Donation amounts (in EUR) do not include our match. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%-level, respectively.

Table A2: Full regression outcomes comparing all treatments except for Forced treatment

	All subjects			Enrolled subjects only	
	(1) Joined	(2) Number of donations	(3) Total donation	(4) Number of donations	(5) Total donation
Regression model	OLS	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
Baseline treatment	F+OC	F+OC	F+OC	F+OC	F+OC
Baseline value	1.00	2.61	8.18	2.61	8.18
Opt-Out	-0.21***	0.05	-0.86	0.74**	2.35
	(0.05)	(0.27)	(1.62)	(0.23)	(1.39)
Opt-In	-0.27***	-0.04	-1.33	0.90***	3.11*
	(0.05)	(0.28)	(1.69)	(0.22)	(1.42)
Pay-to-join	-0.27***	-0.09	-1.04	0.87***	3.61*
	(0.05)	(0.28)	(1.73)	(0.21)	(1.43)
Paid-to-join	-0.11**	-0.04	-1.11	0.29	0.51
	(0.04)	(0.27)	(1.68)	(0.26)	(1.50)
Familiar with the charity	-0.00	-0.05	-0.20	-0.07	-0.23
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.39)	(0.05)	(0.30)
Donates/volunteers frequently	-0.01	-0.04	-0.25	-0.02	-0.13
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.11)
Female	-0.03	0.14	-0.69	0.32*	-0.10
	(0.04)	(0.18)	(1.15)	(0.15)	(0.97)
Currently working	-0.02	0.08	0.85	0.15	1.18
	(0.04)	(0.18)	(1.11)	(0.14)	(0.92)
Weekly spending	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	1.08***	3.00***	10.82***	2.77***	9.62***
	(0.07)	(0.33)	(2.10)	(0.29)	(1.76)
No. of left-censored			81		18
No. of right-censored			40		40
	Post-estimation test p-values				
Opt-Out vs. Opt-in	0.40	0.74	0.78	0.40	0.58
Pay-to-Join vs. Paid-to-Join	0.02	0.85	0.97	0.01	0.04
N	350	350	350	287	287

Notes. Donation amounts (in EUR) do not include our match. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%-level, respectively.

INSTRUCTIONS

Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. A thorough understanding of the instructions is crucial for making good decisions and earning money in the experiment. After completing the instructions, but before you make any decisions, you will be asked 10 questions regarding the instructions. When everyone has completed the experiment, we will randomly choose one of the participants who will earn 3 EUR for every correct answer. Thus, you have a chance to earn up to 30 additional EUR if you pay close attention while reading the instructions.

The experiment – Overview

This experiment consists of 5 stages. In the experiment, you will be allocated an endowment and will have the opportunity to make donations to a charity using this endowment. Any money that you do not donate to the charity will be yours to keep. Your earnings from this experiment and the charity donations will be determined by your decisions. The charity that the donations will go to will remain the same in all stages, but in each stage there may be a different cause for the funds (that is a different project the charity will use funds for). At the start of each stage you will be informed about the charity cause for that stage.

Experiment – Five Stages

Each stage will be separated by between two and four weeks. You will be informed about the start and the end of each stage via email. In each stage, you will have 7 days to log in to this website to claim your money. Note that if you do not log in and claim your money by the end of the stage, you will receive 0 EUR from that stage. It is therefore important that you keep checking your email regularly for the duration of the experiment.

After each stage you will receive a bank transfer for the amount of money that you earned. Also, after each stage, we will make a bank transfer to the charity with the sum of donations accumulated from you and from all other participants. The charity has agreed to provide a donation confirmation and we will share this confirmation to your email address and on our website after the experiment. You are also welcome to make enquiries and verify that the payment has truly been made.

Non-profit organisation

For this experiment, we have partnered with Integra Foundation – a small Slovak-based organization with a big impact on the world. In its 25 years of existence, Integra has helped in 15 different countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Ukraine.

Integra Foundation's core value is sustainability, so that the results are long-lasting and life-changing for generations. Its most important projects include:

- Providing quality education to children and young people in Kenya and Ethiopia to break the generational cycle of poverty fuelled by illiteracy and exploitation, so that a new generation is given hope for a better life.
- In Africa, Integra also helps more than 20 000 farmers, by buying their cashews and macadamia nuts, while employing their women in processing factories, offering decent work under fair working conditions. Integra and the farmers have already planted more than 1.5 million commercial nut trees that help to feed them, while also helping to reduce the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere.
- Integra also helps in places where natural disasters or military conflicts have broken out, currently in Ukraine, Syria and Turkey. In the first year of the war in Ukraine, the

foundation helped more than 370,000 people with rescue packages, built dozens of houses and provided psychological help to several thousand people.

Anonymity

Once the experiment is finished, all your decisions will be anonymized. Thus, nobody will learn the decisions you made. To help us maintain the highest possible scientific validity of this study, please do not share the content of the experiment and your decisions with anyone until the experiment is concluded. If at any point of the experiment you have any questions, please send an email to matej.lorko@euba.sk

Additional instructions for Forced treatment

Stage 1
In this stage, you have been allocated 5 EUR. This money is yours to keep.
Integra Foundation has been allocated 0 EUR.

Today – Automatic Enrollment into our Charity Donor Registry
You have been automatically enrolled to our Charity Donor Registry. You need to be a member of our Charity Donor Registry to be eligible to donate. Note that our Charity Donor Registry will be in place only for the purposes of this experiment and we will not share your name or any personal details with the Integra Foundation or any other organization.

Later Stages – making donations to the charity
In each of the following four stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR. If you claim these 5 EUR, you will learn about the charity cause for each stage and decide how much to donate to the charity and how much to keep for yourself. Note that we will double the amount of each donation. Thus,

- if you decide to donate 0 EUR, you will keep 5 EUR and the charity will receive 0 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 1 EUR, you will keep 4 EUR and the charity will receive 2 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 2 EUR, you will keep 3 EUR and the charity will receive 4 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 3 EUR, you will keep 2 EUR and the charity will receive 6 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 4 EUR, you will keep 1 EUR and the charity will receive 8 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 5 EUR, you will keep 0 EUR and the charity will receive 10 EUR.

Each of the following stages will take you less than 5 minutes to complete.

Additional instructions for Forced+OC treatment

Stage 1
In this stage, you have been allocated 5 EUR. This money is yours to keep.
Integra Foundation has been allocated 2 EUR.

Today – Automatic Enrollment into our Charity Donor Registry
You have been automatically enrolled to our Charity Donor Registry. You need to be a member of our Charity Donor Registry to be eligible to donate. Note that our Charity Donor Registry will be in place only for the purposes of this experiment and we will not share your name or any personal details with the Integra Foundation or any other organization.
To enroll you in our Charity Donor Registry, like most donor registries, there are some costs to cover the effort needed to set you up. For our registry, this fee is 2 EUR. The 2 EUR fee will be paid by the charity. Thus, the charity will receive its 2 EUR allocation but will pay 2 EUR to cover the processing costs to enroll you in the registry and as a result, the charity will receive 0 EUR in the first stage. Note that there are no additional processing fees to maintain the registry in the remaining stages of the experiment.

Later Stages – making donations to the charity
In each of the following four stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR. If you claim these 5 EUR, you will learn about the charity cause for each stage and decide how much to donate to the charity and how much to keep for yourself. Note that we will double the amount of each donation. Thus,

- if you decide to donate 0 EUR, you will keep 5 EUR and the charity will receive 0 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 1 EUR, you will keep 4 EUR and the charity will receive 2 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 2 EUR, you will keep 3 EUR and the charity will receive 4 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 3 EUR, you will keep 2 EUR and the charity will receive 6 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 4 EUR, you will keep 1 EUR and the charity will receive 8 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 5 EUR, you will keep 0 EUR and the charity will receive 10 EUR.

Each of the following stages will take you less than 5 minutes to complete.

Additional instructions for Opt-Out treatment

Stage 1
In this stage, you have been allocated 5 EUR. This money is yours to keep.
Integra Foundation has been allocated 2 EUR.

Today – Automatic Enrollment into our Charity Donor Registry
You have been automatically enrolled to our Charity Donor Registry. You need to be a member of our Charity Donor Registry to be eligible to donate. You can decide if you want to stay in our Charity Donor Registry or leave the registry. You will not be able to change your decision later. Note that our Charity Donor Registry will be in place only for the purposes of this experiment and we will not share your name or any personal details with the charity Integra Foundation or any other organization.
To enroll you in our Charity Donor Registry, like most donor registries, there are some costs to cover the effort needed to set you up. For our registry, this fee is 2 EUR. The 2 EUR fee will be paid by the charity. Thus, if you decide to stay in our registry, the charity will receive its 2 EUR allocation but will pay 2 EUR to cover the processing costs to enroll you in the registry and as a result, the charity will receive 0 EUR in the first stage. Note that there are no additional processing fees to maintain the registry in the remaining stages of the experiment. If you decide to leave our registry, the charity will not be charged the 2 EUR fee and thus will receive 2 EUR in this stage.

Later Stages – making donations to the charity
If you decide to stay in our Charity Donor Registry, in each of the following four stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR. If you claim these 5 EUR, you will learn about the charity cause for each stage and decide how much to donate to the charity and how much to keep for yourself. Note that we will double the amount of each donation. Thus,

- if you decide to donate 0 EUR, you will keep 5 EUR and the charity will receive 0 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 1 EUR, you will keep 4 EUR and the charity will receive 2 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 2 EUR, you will keep 3 EUR and the charity will receive 4 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 3 EUR, you will keep 2 EUR and the charity will receive 6 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 4 EUR, you will keep 1 EUR and the charity will receive 8 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 5 EUR, you will keep 0 EUR and the charity will receive 10 EUR.

If you decide to leave our registry, in each of the following stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR, however, you will not be able to donate anything to the charity in this experiment.
Each of the following stages will take you less than 5 minutes to complete.

Additional instructions for Opt-In treatment

Stage 1
In this stage, you have been allocated 5 EUR. This money is yours to keep.
Integra Foundation has been allocated 2 EUR.

Today – Decision about your enrollment into our Charity Donor Registry
You can decide if you want to join our Charity Donor Registry or not join the registry. You need to be a member of our Charity Donor Registry to be eligible to donate. You will not be able to change your decision later. Note that our Charity Donor Registry will be in place only for the purposes of this experiment and we will not share your name or any personal details with the Integra Foundation or any other organization.
To enroll you in our Charity Donor Registry, like most donor registries, there are some costs to cover the effort needed to set you up. For our registry, this fee is 2 EUR. The 2 EUR fee will be paid by the charity. Thus, if you decide to join our registry, the charity will receive its 2 EUR allocation but will pay 2 EUR to cover the processing costs to enroll you in the registry and as a result, the charity will receive 0 EUR in the first stage. Note that there are no additional processing fees to maintain the registry in the remaining stages of the experiment. If you decide not to join our registry, the charity will not be charged the 2 EUR fee and thus will receive 2 EUR in this stage.

Later Stages – making donations to the charity
If you decide to join our Charity Donor Registry, in each of the following four stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR. If you claim these 5 EUR, you will learn about the charity cause for each stage and decide how much to donate to the charity and how much to keep for yourself. Note that we will double the amount of each donation. Thus,

- if you decide to donate 0 EUR, you will keep 5 EUR and the charity will receive 0 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 1 EUR, you will keep 4 EUR and the charity will receive 2 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 2 EUR, you will keep 3 EUR and the charity will receive 4 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 3 EUR, you will keep 2 EUR and the charity will receive 6 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 4 EUR, you will keep 1 EUR and the charity will receive 8 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 5 EUR, you will keep 0 EUR and the charity will receive 10 EUR.

If you decide not to join our registry, in each of the following stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR, however, you will not be able to donate anything to the charity in this experiment.

Each of the following stages will take you less than 5 minutes to complete.

Additional instructions for Pay-to-Join treatment

Stage 1
In this stage, you have been allocated 7 EUR. This money is yours to keep.
Integra Foundation has been allocated 0 EUR.

Today – Decision about your enrollment into our Charity Donor Registry
You can decide if you want to join our Charity Donor Registry or not join the registry. You need to be a member of our Charity Donor Registry to be eligible to donate. You will not be able to change your decision later. Note that our Charity Donor Registry will be in place only for the purposes of this experiment and we will not share your name or any personal details with the Integra Foundation or any other organization.
To enroll you in our Charity Donor Registry, like most donor registries, there are some costs to cover the effort needed to set you up. For our registry, this fee is 2 EUR. The 2 EUR fee will be paid by the charity. To help the charity pay this fee, if you decide to join the registry, you will give the charity a 2 EUR gift. Thus, if you decide to join our registry, you will receive your 7 EUR allocation but give an automatic 2 EUR gift to the charity to cover the processing costs to enroll you in the registry and as a result, you will receive 5 EUR in the first stage. Note that there are no additional processing fees to maintain the registry nor automatic gifts to the charity in the remaining stages of the experiment.
If you decide not to join our registry, the charity will not be charged the 2 EUR fee and you will not give the charity an automatic gift and thus you will receive 7 EUR in this stage.

Later Stages – making donations to the charity
If you decide to join our Charity Donor Registry, in each of the following four stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR. If you claim these 5 EUR, you will learn about the charity cause for each stage and decide how much to donate to the charity and how much to keep for yourself. Note that we will double the amount of each donation. Thus,

- if you decide to donate 0 EUR, you will keep 5 EUR and the charity will receive 0 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 1 EUR, you will keep 4 EUR and the charity will receive 2 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 2 EUR, you will keep 3 EUR and the charity will receive 4 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 3 EUR, you will keep 2 EUR and the charity will receive 6 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 4 EUR, you will keep 1 EUR and the charity will receive 8 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 5 EUR, you will keep 0 EUR and the charity will receive 10 EUR.

If you decide not to join our registry, in each of the following stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR, however, you will not be able to donate anything to the charity in this experiment.
Each of the following stages will take you less than 5 minutes to complete.

Additional instructions for Paid-to-Join treatment

Stage 1
In this stage, you have been allocated 3 EUR. This money is yours to keep.
Integra Foundation has been allocated 4 EUR.

Today – Decision about your enrollment into our Charity Donor Registry
You can decide if you want to join our Charity Donor Registry or not join the registry. You need to be a member of our Charity Donor Registry to be eligible to donate. You will not be able to change your decision later. Note that our Charity Donor Registry will be in place only for the purposes of this experiment and we will not share your name or any personal details with the charity Integra Foundation or any other organization.

To enroll you in our Charity Donor Registry, like most donor registries, there are some costs to cover the effort needed to set you up. For our registry, this fee is 2 EUR. The 2 EUR fee will be paid by the charity. In addition, if you decide to join the registry, the charity will give you a gift of 2 EUR. Thus, if you decide to join our registry, the charity will receive its 4 EUR allocation but will pay 2 EUR to cover the processing costs to enroll you in the registry and will give you a gift of 2 EUR and as a result, the charity will receive 0 EUR and you will receive 5 EUR in the first stage. Note that there are no additional processing fees to maintain the registry nor gifts from the charity in the remaining stages of the experiment. If you decide not to join our registry, the charity will not be charged the 2 EUR fee and will not give you a gift and thus will receive 4 EUR in this stage.

Later Stages – making donations to the charity
If you decide to join our Charity Donor Registry, in each of the following four stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR. If you claim these 5 EUR, you will learn about the charity cause for each stage and decide how much to donate to the charity and how much to keep for yourself. Note that we will double the amount of each donation. Thus,

- if you decide to donate 0 EUR, you will keep 5 EUR and the charity will receive 0 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 1 EUR, you will keep 4 EUR and the charity will receive 2 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 2 EUR, you will keep 3 EUR and the charity will receive 4 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 3 EUR, you will keep 2 EUR and the charity will receive 6 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 4 EUR, you will keep 1 EUR and the charity will receive 8 EUR.
- if you decide to donate 5 EUR, you will keep 0 EUR and the charity will receive 10 EUR.

If you decide not to join our registry, in each of the following stages, you will be allocated an additional 5 EUR, however, you will not be able to donate anything to the charity in this experiment.
Each of the following stages will take you less than 5 minutes to complete.

Questionnaires

Familiarity with the Integra Foundation

1. I was familiar with Integra Foundation before this experiment.
(from strongly disagree to strongly agree)

2. I have previously contributed to Integra Foundation
(Never – Once – A couple of times – Many times)

3. The causes Integra Foundation supports are worthwhile
(from strongly disagree to strongly agree)

4. Integra Foundation uses the donations it receives effectively
(from strongly disagree to strongly agree)

Frequency of charitable behavior

1. In past 2 years, how many times have you donated money to any charity?
(0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – more than 4)

2. In past 2 years, how many times have you donated items (e.g. clothes, toys…) to any charity?
(0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – more than 4)

3. In past 2 years, how many times have you volunteered (for free) for a charity?
(0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – more than 4)

4. In past 2 years, how many times have you donated blood?
(0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – more than 4)

5. In past 2 years, how many times have you donated blood plasma (for free)?
(0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – more than 4)

Attitudes Towards Charitable Giving questionnaire (Furnham, 1995)

(all from strongly disagree to strongly agree)

1. Far too much money is wasted in the administration of charities
2. Each of us has duty to help other through charities giving
3. Too many charities do not distinguish between deserving and undeserving
4. Helping people to help themselves is the ultimate aim of most charities
5. Charity is an intelligent way of distributing money
6. Giving to charity is a personal form of thanks-giving
7. There should be no need for charity: the state should pay for the needy through money collected in taxes
8.Most people give to charity out of pure sympathy with the recipient
9. The trouble with charity is that it leads to dependency
10. Unlike taxation, through charitable giving people can target or control exactly where their money is going
11. There seems to be a lot of corruption in charity collection and distribution
12. People who give to charity, and work for, charity are genuinely altruistic
13. Many individuals (and large organization) who donate sums of money to charity have ulterior motives
14. Charitable giving is the most efficient way of getting help to needy
15. For many charity donation is simply a tax dodge
16. Charities have to exist to assist causes not covered by the state
17. Charities rely too much on sentimentality and not enough on realities
18. People give more money to causes they identify with
19. Many people try to solve their conscience by small gifts to charity
20. Too many organizations hide behind the mask (and tax advantages) of being a charity

Abstrakt

Charitativní organizace často vyzývají potenciální dárce, aby se nejprve zaregistrovali, a až poté je oslovují s žádostí o dar. Behaviorální teorie naznačují, že volba architektury rozhodování při registraci může ovlivnit nejen samotnou účast, ale i budoucí dárcovství. Některé přístupy k architektuře rozhodování mohou být účinnější při zvyšování pravděpodobnosti registrace, ale zároveň mohou snižovat následnou ochotu darovat a výši darů, zatímco jiné mohou mít opačný efekt. V tomto článku experimentálně testujeme čtyři behaviorální teorie – averzi k režii, zkreslení status quo, reciprocitu a morální konzistenci – v dvoustupňovém modelu zapojení dárců. Zjišťujeme, že (1) zveřejnění režijních nákladů spojených s registrem snižuje dary, (2) změna výchozího způsobu registrace (opt-in vs. opt out) neovlivňuje ani registraci, ani dary, (3) cílení na reciprocitu prostřednictvím nabídky malého dárku podmíněného registrací zvyšuje počet registrací, avšak nevede k vyšším darům, a (4) cílení na morální konzistenci prostřednictvím žádosti o příspěvek předem nesnižuje pravděpodobnost registrace a zvyšuje výnosy charity. Naše zjištění ukazují, jak jemné rozdíly v architektuře přístupu k dárcům v rané fázi mohou ovlivnit dlouhodobé výsledky fundraisingu.

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Email: office@cerge-ei.cz
Web: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/

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