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Let us  invite you to a Brown Bag Seminar given by Arseniy Samsonov (Budapest University of Technology)
on Nov 8th, at 13:00 in Room 402

Online link for the seminar: https://call.lifesizecloud.com/16244362
Passcode: 1845

Presenter: Arseniy Samsonov

Title: "Transparency and symmetry: information as a bargaining solution" (with Kemal Kivanc Aköz)

Abstract: How transparent would informational institutions be if the founders of those institutions have to agree on the design? In this paper, we explore this question and analyze distributional consequences of information. Consider a model of Bayesian persuasion, where a social planner chooses an information structure that induces an allocation of a bargaining surplus among a set of agents. We first characterize the existence of an agreement that is beneficial for all agents. We show that a beneficial agreement exists if for every coalition there exists a belief that generate enough total surplus to allocate among the coalition members. We define maximally informative endorsement rules, which inform the receiver which agent to support. There is such a rule that corresponds to the symmetric Nash bargaining solution in symmetric environments. Even in asymmetric environments, there is a maximally informative endorsement rule that is Pareto efficient among agents whenever such rules are beneficial. We later discuss three applications of our model about lobbying by banks for bailout rules, media freedom in autocracies, and political campaigns in multiparty systems.

This project is co-financed by the European Union.