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Wednesday, 4 March, 2026
Artem Razumovskii: Essays in Economic Theory
Dissertation Committee:
Jan Zápal (CERGE-EI, chair)
Yiman Sun (CERGE-EI)
Ole Jann (CERGE-EI)
Defense Committee:
Krešimir Žigić (CERGE-EI, chair)
Ctirad Slavík (CERGE-EI)
Miloš Kopa (Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University)
Referees:
Orestis Troumpounis (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice)
Ludmila Matyskova (University of Alicante)
Meeting link:
https://cerge-ei.webex.com/cerge-ei/j.php?MTID=m791bc91da0a06810665709981671f4ab
Meeting number: 2740 322 4423, Meeting password: 385612
Abstract:
The first chapter of the dissertation focuses on optimal and self-imposed interim deadlines for naïve, sophisticated, and partially-sophisticated agents in a single-project context. I find that for each type, there is a unique design for an exogenous interim deadline that maximizes the agent’s welfare. However, only the sophisticated agent would self-impose an optimal interim deadline, while the naïve agent would not apply a self-imposed deadline at all. The partially-sophisticated agent sets a nonoptimal self-imposed deadline, which can actually decrease her own welfare. The main result is that the partially-sophisticated agent who is relatively less present-biased would decrease her own welfare by setting a self-imposed deadline, and the partially-sophisticated agent who is relatively more present-biased would increase her welfare given the same degree of sophistication.
The second chapter studies the symmetry and uniqueness of the optimal pair of interim deadlines in the case of two parallel projects. I find that imposing an interim deadline in one project may shift the optimal timing for the interim deadline in the parallel project to earlier or later. The size of the effect and the uniqueness of the optimal pair of timings for interim deadlines in both projects depend on the agent’s present bias. The optimal pair is not unique, and the distance between deadlines in the parallel project is higher for a less present-biased agent.
The third chapter, co-authored with Misha Gipsman1 and Artyom Jelnov2, investigates the removal of trade barriers by the toll collector under the threat of conflict with a central authority. We show that the toll collector relaxes the barriers and allows more merchants to reach the market when under the threat of conflict. However, the toll collector allows only a few merchants to cross, maintaining a significant restriction on trade.
Full Text: "Essays in Economic Theory"
